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INTRODUCTION

'Judicial review' has

been defined as 'any judicial action that involves the review of

an inferior legal norm for conformity with a higher one, with the implicit possibility that
the reviewing

court

may

invalidate

or suspend the

inferior

norm

desirable. ''This definition covers both review of legislative acts

However, such review has not been a very
law.

Though

it

The main reason

it

some of the

written post independence

of development was the emergence of dictatorships

In the former British colonies the situation

the adoption of the Westminster

and fused the two

acts.

has not evolved into a living principle of juridical democracy.

for such lack

post colonial era.

and executive

significant concept of African constitutional

has been explicitly provided for in

African constitutions,"

or

if necessar\'

political

was

in the

further aggravated

by

Model of government which made parliament supreme

branches of government, enabling these

two branches

to

balance their joint power against the judiciary.^

The Malawian post
other African countries

colonial era experience though similar in

was materially

Utter &Lundsgaard, Judicial review in the

From a Comparative

Perspective. 54

"The 1960 Constitution of Nigeria,
the

Ghana

Constitutional

after the bill

^HARVEY,

s.

Ohio

1

16

(

different.

most respects

The country adopted

to the

a constitution

New Nations
St. L. J.

of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts
559 (1993).

allowing advisory opinions with regard to legislation). See also

Commission Proposals of 1968 par.451

at

120

(

recommending advisory opinions

had passed through the national Assembly but before assent).

LAW AND

SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA,

(

1966)

(

arguing that the basically democratic thesis

of the British government was ultimately distorted by the emergency of autocratic tendencies

independence

era).

in the post

2
that

was

a severely modified version of the Westminster Model.''

this constitution didn't incorporate a Bill

Among

other things

of Rights and the High Court's role was

reduced to vague supervisory functions.^ The position of the High Court was further

weakened due
the

to the constitutional

High Court

amendments of 1969 which removed jurisdiction of

in capital offenses to the local courts

which were an arm of the executive

government. The overall effect was the creation of a dependent judiciary and wanton

human

violations of individual and

rights.

Fortunately this situation has been remedied by the

1

994

Constitution.'' This

constitution gives the judiciary a central position along the lines of the

system.

It

makes

US

new

constitutional

the court the guardian of the Constitution and an organ for the

protection of rights against any arbitrary action by government.

Scope Of Thesis

With

this

background

US

judicial review in the

Malawi.

We will

look

in

mind, the thesis will examine the notions and practice of

constitutional system and

its

viability in the

new

socio-economic and political perspectives

at this in the historical,

to highlight the impact

weigh

of these factors on judicial review

in

Malawi.

We

will

also

consider the fact that the country has been exposed to about three decades of executive

omnipotence and the

effect

of

this

exposure,

if

any, on the society and the judiciary

in

general.

This

is

a comparative study and our purpose

and weaknesses of the present constitutional

'See

MALAWI CONSTITUTION

1966

[

hereinafter

set

is

to attempt to indicate the strengths

up and

to

propose that a religious

MAL.CONST.]

The High Court power of judicial review extended only

to the criminal proceedings

from the subordinate

courts and other administrative actions and decisions effected by the lesser officials in the executive

branch.

Adopted

after the

1993 referendum adopting a multiparty system of government

3

copying

of the form of the

proposal

is

that the

human

will

work

to the detriment

Malawi judiciary should come up with a

framework of judicial review
individual and

US model

rights.

in order to

of the society. Our

flexible

and unique

enhance the role of the courts as guardians of

CHAPTER 1

THE HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The decline of colonialism and
opened a formative era
in their

own image

the customary

The economy
it

.

which the new nations attempted

in

to fashion the legal structures

This involved the task of incorporating both the colonial laws and

unwritten laws in the

,

the ascendancy of independent nations in Africa

new

legal structures.

Malawi was no exception.

the culture, the society and the law at independence

largely remains the

same

was a

to this day. This situation

were

result

pluralistic

and

of the colonial

administration which tended to separate the white settlers from the indigenous people, in

terms of governing rules, residential areas etc The British colonial style was to leave the
African legal institutions to provide courts and customary law for the great majority of
the population

.

As

a result customary law

and these areas comprise 90
examining the

7

19 Cliff F.

9

Malawi

AFRICA AND

governs the people in the rural areas,

% of the population in the whole country. That

of judicial review as a tool for the safeguard of

Thomson, The Sources of law

the Sudan, in
g

institution

still

LAW

in the

New Nations

human

rights.

at

p 133

attained independence on 6 July 1964 and republican status on 6 July 1966

The white

settlers

were governed by

British statutes introduced into the territory

Council of 1902 which allowed the application of British law "in so
territory

why when

of Africa: A case study from he Republic of

Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1968)

(

is

and

its

far

by Nyasaland order

in

only as the ircumstance of the

inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local ircumstances

may

render

necessary."

The African Studies Branch, Judicial systems of the

CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA

(

British territories in Africa, in

Universtaire pers Leiden 1956)

(

former name for Malawi, the colonial judiciary consisted of the High Court
Native Courts

').

Emphasis mine.

THE FUTURE OF

stating that in Nyasaland,
,

which

Subordinate Courts and

is

a

5

human

rights,

one can not afford

to ignore the continuing disparity

economic development between the people

in the

in

social

and

urban and the rural areas.

A) The Precolonial Traditional Society
i

When

)

The

Social

And Economic Matrix

the colonial powers arrived in Africa in the latter part of the

they found a sparse subsistence economy holding the continent in

The

first

legal

Malawi government attempted

framework

to

Malawi's economy

to

improve

this situation

its

1

9th Century,

implacable grip."

by providing a different

govern customary land holding since the technological basis of
12

is

Thus, within three years of independence,

farming.

enacted three statutes: the

first

was

the

parliament

Customary Land Development Act, which

provided for the ascertainment of rights and interest in customary land and for

its

conversion for better agricultural development; the second was the Registered Land Act

which provided the machinery

was

finally there

the

for registering titles to land, including allocated land;

and

Local Land Boards Act which sought to control dealings in

allocated land after registration.

During the Parliamentary proceedings leading to the above enactments, former
President

land

Dr Banda

,

emphasized

was outdated, wasteful and

agriculture as the basis of the

Robert Seidman,
/i>/ca,
12

is

5

economy.

in

tilling the

development of a country with

In his opinion the

major

problem was the

Independent, English Speaking, Sub-Saharan

(1968).

land locked and has very few minerals.

'^Acts Nos.5-7 of 1967, Caps 59:01, 58:01 and 59:02 of the
14

customs for holding and

totally unsuitable for the

Law and Economic Development

w AFRICA AND LAW

The country

that the existing

And Implementation of Customary Land Reforms
Law ,115 (1982).

See Clement Ng'ong'ola, The Design
Malawi, 26 Journal of Afi-ican

Laws of Malawi.
In Central

absence of individual

titles:

"No one

is

responsible

...

use of land because no one holds land as an individual. Land

everybody's baby

is

no ones baby

at all."

He

'

uneconomic and wasted

for the

held in

is

common

further noted that the only

.

.

.

and

way

encourage individuals and institutions to provide loans for the development of land

is

to

by

way of
and recognizing the principle or idea of individual

accepting

ownership

owns

family,

land and secondly by insisting that anyone

of

land,

is strictly

who

an individual or as the head of his or her

whether as

responsible for the economic and the productive

use of his or her land; otherwise

it

must be taken away

.

Despite these efforts there has not been a significant improvement in the standard

of living for people

an exaggeration

in the rural areas during the past three decades,

to state that

Seidman's observation of 1968

still

so that

it

will not be

holds true for the

country, namely that, "the farmer and his wives people the rural scene, their feet
straddled wide, leaning from the waist to hack the refractory soil with a heavy, short

handled hoe and a matchet, almost the sole agricultural tools and that
rarely used

and productivity

results in a pathetically

is

very low."

low standard of living

fertilizers are

This low level of economic productivity
for people in the rural areas so that

be absurd to expect these people to hire lawyers

to

it

pursue their infringed rights in court.

Hansard, Proceedings of the Malawi Parliament, 4th session, 1966-67, 403 and, generally, 399-412.

''id.
17

See

infra, text in

Chapter

18

See supra,

at

note

1 1

111.

will

The Customary

ii)

Many

writers have emphasized that Courts are not a western invention. Every

some

society evolves

community

Judicial Process

or

its

by which disputes are heard and the

institution or procedure

representatives partake in their resolutions.

traditional African societies.

However

the judicial function

customary law
(i)

were three main

there

Basically,

and

their existence

communal

arbitral courts; (ii)

found

most organized

in the

(the chief in Council)

power

to

decide on

.

true of the

in these societies

its

kinds of courts or proceedings in the ancient

courts;

societies

(iii)

judicial

own motion

Thomas M.

20

This has

Franck,

and

23
.

Allot,

ESSAYS

is

IN

judicial courts

And

its

main

was

characteristic

to enforce

its

it

that

comprised
it

The power of such a

judgments.

initiative

by the aggrieved party
lightly

when

had the

RIGHTS

IN

writers to

THIRD

WORLD PERSPECTIVE,

dub African Law

is

and

tribunal

a characteristic

discussing the issue of

new Malawian democracy. The importance of

HUMAN

were

the attendance of concerned parties, to investigate

absence of any

made some western

The discussion

The

and were comprised of chiefs, headmen and elders

of African customary law which can not be treated
judicial review in the

courts.

This was the highest court in these societies since

summon and compel

to decide a case in the

^^

and process

is

depended largely on the type of society. These were:

of the central authority of the land

21

The same

quiet different to the notions found in western societies.

is

'^

19

Vol.

1

this characteristic

at

p. 171.

primitive.

referring to the Judicial systems before colonization.

AFRICAN LAW

THE COURTS TO GOVERNMENT

1

117 (1960)

(1981)

(

.

See also A.N.E. Amissah,

THE CONTRIBUTION OF

stating that " [t]raditional African societies recognized a

central authority and kept the judicial function as one of the roles of the governing Chief in Council").
23

24

Amissah

id, (

calling

it

a supreme executive-cum-legislative body

This can be equated with declaratory judgments

25

Allot, supra, note

22

at

p 68.

in

).

western societies.

8

becomes

when one

especially obvious

considers the

US

court's lack of judicial

power

in

the absence of litigants.

The communal
societies.

These were

courts were the equivalent of the judicial courts in centralized

found in societies with no chiefs.

this court is that either the

community

as a

27

The major

characteristic

of

whole or a large portion of it participated

in

the dispensation of justice.

And

finally, there

traditional Africa.

and family

were

These were
28

levels.

which were

arbitral courts

and were found

lesser courts

These are

still

common

to all the societies in
clan, kindred,

at village,

in existence in the rural areas in

Malawi.

It

is

important to note that the arbitral process constitutes the machinery for the settling of

And hence

disputes by negotiation and agreement.

was

the

main concern of these courts

the settlement of disputes arising within families or other social groups

most appropriately
courts

is

persuasion.

The emphasis

is

from the judicial courts

try

interpretation of the law and

would thus

to restore

(

Justice

work on

parties instead

of the use

hard not to impose a decision based on the

harmony.

See the requirements under the
Stanton, 6 Wall 50,75

in these

arbiters

in that the

on the goodwill and consent of the

of force. The head would

of law in order

by the family head. The procedure

settled within the family

slightly different

which were

in

strict

most cases deviate from the applicable

rules

Thus, this approach makes customary law largely

US CONST.

Art.

Ill

Thompson advocating

infra text in

Chapter

II;

See

to the rigid rule that courts

also,

Georgia

v.

of justice should only

give relief to aggrieved persons where they present their allegations of violations of rights

in

some form

of judicial proceedings.)
27
Allot, supra, note
28.

22 (giving as examples the Kingere and Kikuyu of Kenya).

,

id.

29

id,at]\7.
30

This makes customary law very flexible and that

leveled against customary law have been that "it
application,

it is

is

is

why some of the main

not fixed and certain,

criticisms that

it is

have been

not sharp and precise in

not effectively complied with because there are no sanctions."

its

9

and contrasts sharply with the

flexible

established as a check on

its

is

quite important characteristic of the traditional judicial

mode of dispensing justice

the

court has

powers.

The other unique and
system

US

procedural rules which the

rigid

3

in the settlement

of disputes. The court's goal

achieve reconciliation and restoration of harmony, rather than a desire to follow

is to

precedent.

Tthis

is

done by emphasizing

duties instead of rights in adjudication. This

has led some writers to point out, albeit erroneously, that "under African customary law

an individual carmot appeal
that

doesn't

it

human

to 'the law'

guarantee such rights".

in defense

The

of his

true position is that traditional African

rights are understood in a totally different context

context.

And

the courts role

whole as opposed

to the

US

is

for the simple reason

'rights'

from the western human

more of an enforcer of morals

constitutional system

for the

rights

community

as a

which emphasize individualism and

whereby courts are deemed protectors of individual

The question

rights.

is

whether a

society schooled under such customary principles can appeal to the present court for the

31

Ann

P.

Munro, Land law

in

Kenya,

in

AFRICA AND

LAW 77

(

1968)

(

suggesting that "[t]he African

was more concerned in bringing a disrupted social situation back
equilibrium and that it was restitutive rather than punitive in motive").

juridical process

^^A.N. Allot, African law,
33

Munro

in

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS

supra, note 30 at p. 76

(

quoting and indorsing Phillips views

in,

145

(

J

to

D

some

sort

of new

M Derrett ed,

1968).

Report on Native Tribunals

(1945)atp.276).
34

Franck Mordene, Human Rights and Post colonial Constitutions in Suh-Saharan Africa, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 315- 318 (Loise Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds.,1990)
( indorsing the view that there is no universal concept of human rights) See also GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 14-15 ( Hurst Hannum ed 1992).( suggesting that "it is
not possible for countries with different cultures political systems, and ideologies, and

of economic development to have the same
35

when

there

is

at different stages

some

conflicts").

Ziyad Motala, Independence of the Judiciary, prospects and limitations ofjudicial review in terms of
US model in a new South African order: towards an alternative judicial structure, 2 Comp. and Int'r.

the
L.

priorities regarding rights

1

J.

of

S. Afr.

285, 288.

10

protection of individual rights, which

is

an

alien concept to the

customary system of

governance.

Another feature which characterizes customary law
very important decisions.

A

deemed

whole community.

be

to

vital to the

general meeting of

is

the people decides

all

when an

issue is

This enhances one authors belief that in

traditional African societies the judicial procedure reflects the

that

the procedure followed in

common

government and decision are ultimately by popular consent.

African principle

Consequently

this

practice gives traditional African judicial systems a measure of flexibility and simplicity

which

is

absent

in the

All the above

model of

judicial

population

is still

judicial

western legal systems.

factors reinforce our

that a wholesale adoption

review will prove problematic
greatly influenced

framework has always been

(iii)

In the last sub topic
is

it

for

Malawi

liquid under

of the

US

as the bulk of the

by customary principles of law. The

the set of rigid flexible and procedural rules

Traditional Africa

view

fact that the

customary law will be a big obstacle to

which

is

characteristic

of the

US

model.

The Concept Of Human Rights
was pointed out

that the concept

of human rights in

understood in a different context from the western concept. This

a result of the history, special characteristics of the societies and the

human

is

relationships

-JO

The big

within them.
socialist"

in

difference

approach,

whereas

^^K.A Busia, AFRICA IN SEARCH

is that,

"ideologically, customary law

in western societies

OF DEMOCRACY,

23 (1967)

human

is

rights are

communal

or

based on the

.

37

Supra, note 10
38

,

at

p 69.

For example "most traditional African societies had mechanisms for the redistribution of economic

surpluses and have been viewed by
addition land
39

AJGM

was

Sanders,

some

researchers as limiting private control of productive property. In

distributed to families on the basis of collective need". See supra, text on pages 2-3.

On African Socialism and the Rule of Law,

15

Comp.

&

Int'r L.

J.

S. Afri.

299, 300

11

Rhoda

premise that a person has rights by virtue of his being an individual being.

Howard

described the African approach in the following

important than the individual, and that decisions are

words: "the group

made by consensus

right to individual

ownership

The importance of

some of

the post

is

It is

more
by

rather than

competition and economic surpluses are generated and disposed of on a
rather than a profit oriented basis".

is

redistributive

on the basis of these arrangements

that

the

not encouraged.

the communitarian ideal

is illustrated

by the commitments of

independent African leaders. The former president of Tanzania

endorsed the importance of the ideal in these words:

The foundation and
extended

family....

socialism.

It is

the

objective

of African socialism

the

is

Ujamaa, then, or familyhood describes our
to capitalism which seeks to build a happy

opposed

society on the basis of the exploitation of

man by man; and

it

equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build

happy society on a philosophy of

We

and man.

in Africa,

inevitable conflict

between

is
its

man

have no more need of being converted to

we have of being converted to democracy. Both
own past, in the traditional society which produces

socialism than

are

rooted in our

us.

Modem

African socialism can draw from

its

traditional heritage the

recognition of society as an extension of the basic family unit.

(1982)

(

distinguishing African socialism and

state, the law, or religion as

elements of an ideal society which,
religious feeling, a

communism, and

stating that the

an instrument of oppression. But rather that

communal

spirit

it

former "does not view the

considers them indispensable

African society, will again be characterized by

like traditional

and a belief in democracy based on government by popular

discussion and consensus").
40
Is

There

An African Concept of Human

Rights in

WORKING PAPER

N0.4(A-8), 4

(

1983)This

arrangement provides a form of social-security system.

'^Keneth Kaunda,

A HUMANIST

IN

AFRICA

24

(

1966)

(

stating that the "[t]he tribal

community was

a

was organized to satisfy the basic human needs of all its members and
therefore individualism was discouraged and that [social harmony was a vital necessity) Note that Kaunda
was the first president of Zambia").

mutual society and

[i]t

Ujamaa The Basis of African Socialism, in UJAMAA, ESSAYS
See also Kaunda, id CF.. Dr Banda's approach. Supra, text on pages 4-5.

'^^See J.K. Nyerere,

(1966).

that

ON SOCIALISM

1

12

Other African writers have also stressed the importance of the communitarian

personhood

Ifeani Menkiti explains that

ideal.

can only be attained

in traditional society

through an individual's participation in the society:

Personhood

is

the sort of thing

which has

to

be attained and

attained in direct proportion as one participates in

is

communal

life

through the discharge of various obligations defined by one's
situations

the

....It is

community which defines

becomes persons only
This

indicates

that

after a process

rights

the person

persons

of incorporation.

contingent upon

are

...

one's

fulfillment

obligations in the society, and the subsequent granting of rights by the group.

premise which

has led some

it is

this

It is

authors to conclude that the traditional African society

does not guarantee the protection of individual

However

of one's

rights.

important to note that "though the individual lacks

many of the

that are so highly valued in the liberal democratic state, he has a secure

rights

and significant

place in his society" and "furthermore he has available regularized social protections of

many of the

values and interests which in the west are protected through individual and
Nevertheless, though communitarian

legal rights".

remains prevalent in rural Malawi,

become

true that the people in the urban areas

development

to the social

changes that have taken place in Africa since

and Community in African Traditional Thought,
INTRODUCTION, 2d ed.( Richard A. Wright, ed., 1979).

44

Donelly,

Human
45

have

European incursion:

^^ Person

J.

still

increasingly motivated by ambition for individual advancement. Ali Mazrui has

attributed this

the

is

it

mode of thinking and behavior

Rights.

in

AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: AN

Human rights and Human Dignity: An Analytical Critique ofNon
76 Am.Poht. Sc. Rev.Vol. 304

See Munro, supra, note 3

1

46,

Donelly, supra, note 44,

at

304.

.

Western Conceptions of

13

Under

the western impact,

some

reshuffling of principles of

behavioral motivation took place. The pursuit of basic needs

remains primary in a westernized Africa. But next in

still

importance

now

tends to be the pursuit of self advancement

beyond basic needs.

In other words, the basic needs of the

wider clan are beginning to be subordinated to the imperative
of personal advancement.

These new pursuits have resulted

And

and the

clan.

society

which stands

which

is

it

in structural dislocations involving the family

will not be an exaggeration to suggest that
to benefit

more from

the

rights

whole

is

And

Political

On paper,

the theory of institutionalism

limited and accountable government

government.

'*^Ali

48

A. Mazrui,

L.C.B. Gower,

,

state.

branch of

as noted earlier,

The

embodying

First

Malawi

Republican

the concept of

separation of powers and open participatory

In reality, however, the country

presidentialist executive

statutes,

fundamentally a problem of political philosophy and

adopted the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy.

was based on

rights,

Framework

rights through the judicial

of the dominant ideology of government power.

Constitution

of

and freedoms against the intrusion of the

The problem of safeguarding human
in Africa as a

minority urban

acts, the constitutionality

B) The Post Independence Juridical

government

this

American conception of human

based on judicial review of governmental

and the guarantee of individual

it is

embraced what has been described as

system of government characterized by a dominant executive

THE AFRICAN CONDITION

54 (1980).

INDEPENDENT AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION

4-34 (1967)

(arguing that "all the former British colonies inherited a distorted version of the Westminster model of

parliamentary democracy")

'^'^MAL.
50

,

,

la,

CONST.

(1966) cap.

^,

Chapters iv-vi

.

vii.

14

not subject to meaningful external institutional restraint, and hence, not publicly

Dr Kamuzu Banda,

accountable.^'

the

first

president of Malawi advised of his

untouchable position in the following words as early as 1963 "Anything

I

say

is

law.

52

Literally law.

It is

a fact in this country".

The

i)

On

the surface, the institutional

Institutional Set

Up

framework of the Malawi Republican constitution

resembled the ideal Westminster scheme of government which
emulate.

composed of the

It

parliament.

The National Assembly was supposed

government subject only
and the judiciary

Ibrahim

of the people

was a provision

from the

53
,

to be the

,

was supposed

to

the judiciary and the

supreme organ of the

the executive subject to parliament,

political

in the constitution

Wani, The Rule of Law and Economic Development

branches of government. In

acknowledging the

in Africa, E. Afri.

J.

fact that

of Peace and

Rights 52, 55 (1993). See also Robert Seidman, The Reception of English law In Colonial Africa

Revisited
in

J.

to the will

to be independent

addition to this there

Human

three separate organs: the executive

it

,

1

E.A. L. Rev. 47 (1969)

(

stating that "English law administered

by the colonial governments

Africa was a truncated, narrow law whose juristic theme was contract unrestrained by either welfare

state

legislation or democratic institutions

and that

this greatly influence

of presidential systems that

emerged in post independent Africa" ). Note also that most of the post independence African leaders
evoked African tradition to legitimize deviation from parliamentary democracy and the concentration of
powers in one executive. See Y. Ghai, Law and Legitimacy in East Africa, 14 Intl. Jnl. Soc. L. 179-208
(1986) ( citing a memorandum from the president's office in Kenya asserting that " in order to meet the
needs of the people, government should be personalized in one individual who is easily accessible,
sympathetic, understanding and authoritative"). See also i.K.'NyeTere, How much power for a leader,
AFRICA REPORT, 5 ( July 1962) ( Suggesting that "the traditional leader was chosen for his wisdom and
that he was entrusted with all the necessary powers to do what he considered proper and necessary for the
community").
52

Banda, Speech

53

Art 1(2)

(

at

dinner for Lonrho executives, 8

is

reasonably

economy").

1963, N.I.D. press release.

vesting the powers of the Republic of Malawi in the peoples representatives

Assembly). See also Art. 2(2) ( stating
shall be held to be inconsistent with or
question

November

that
in

"nothing contained

in

m the National

or done under the authority of any law

contravention of [the constitution

]

to the extent that the

law

required in the interest of defense, public safety, public order or the national

in

15

"recognized the sanctity of the personal liberties enshrined in the United

government

Nations Declaration of Human Rights

.

arrangements, parliamentary democracy gave rise to executive

Despite these

omnipotence

."
.

number of reasons. The

for a

first

one was

was no

that there

of powers among the branches of government. The president and

And

members of parliament.

in addition, the president

Assembly where he considered

to the National

it

all

had powers

real separation

the ministers were

to

nominate people

desirable to enhance the representative

character of the Assembly, or to represent particular minority or other special interests

The

in the Republic.

was

result

that the executive, especially the President exerted

controlling influence on the National Assembly.'

by the

fact that the president

was

This scenario was further aggravated

the head of the Party

member of

National Assembly elections unless he or she was a
party

58
.

Through

staunch

practice, this condition

member of

had implied powers

^%AL. CONST.
^^Art.

20

Note
and

as

amended by

that Art.

in the

was developed

to

mean

the

Malawi Congress

that a person

had

to be a

the party in order to be elected."

In addition to this, the president

any time.

This setting operated to induce

to dissolve parliament at

(1966)

and no person could run for the

art 18

&I9.

8 of 1981.

37 of the Constitution allowed the president

to take part in the

Assembly's proceedings

proceedings of any Committee of the Assembly.

Malawi was a one party

state

under Art. 4 of the 1966 Constitution.

58

See Art. 10 (2)

(

d).

Note

that

under Article 96 (1)

(e)

of the 1994 Constitution the Ministers are

members of Parliament. See The Attorney General V Mapopa Chipeta M.S.C.A

Civil

No. 33

still

Of 1994

(

explaining that Article 96 requires ministers to be 'available' to parliament to answer questions concerning

government
59

policies

For example

all

and

that this provision qualifies

names submitted

for elections

them

to be

members of parliament).

were scrutinized by the president

in his

capacity as head

of the party before giving approval.

It is

curious to note that President Dr Banda exercised this power often whenever parliament hesitated

to indorse

proposed government

only stated that "every

which dealt with tenure of members of parliament
Assembly shall vacate his seat... upon a dissolution of
dissolution was in relation to the completion of the 5 year

policies, yet Art. 28,

member of the

national

parliament" without specifying whether this

16

the parliament to support

governmental proposed policies

all

avoid conflicts

in order to

with the government.

Perhaps not surprisingly, parliamentary democracy, or the attempt to create one,

began

soon

to disintegrate

adoption of the 1966 Republican Constitution. The

after the

powers of the Republic instead of deriving from the people as stipulated under

1

(2)

were abducted by the executive organ. The Government was able

of the Constitution

push through National Assembly

.

Such laws

included the Decency in Dress Act which was a dressing code regulating
dressing, the Preservation of
for indefinite periods,

The question

that

to

oppressive laws under the guise of protecting and

advancing defense, public safety, public order or the national economy

trial

Art.

mode of

Public Security Act which authorized detentions without

and the Forfeiture Act

one may ask

is,

what

,

just to

mention a few.

role did the judiciary play in this setting?

This takes us to the second reason for the failure of the parliamentary democracy to

human

protect individual and

independence judiciary

and independence

term or

it

is

rights

.

In order

to understand the position

of the post

important to examine factors that determine the efficiency

of the judiciary, for example,

the

composition, appointing

at the president's instance.

See supra, note 52.

of the 1966 Constitution gave Government unlimited powers

Art. 2(2)

to

do anything as long as

it

was

done under the authority of a law whether good or bad. The operating words of the provision was
nothing shall be held to be inconsistent with the constitution.

Act No.

1

of 1966. The statute sought to expose certain persons to forfeiture of property and also

provided for the subjection of such persons to further legal

was drawn

in

disabilities.

The unfortunate thing was

that

very general terms. The principle section provided that

If the minister

is

the safety or the

satisfied that

any person

economy of the

state or

is,

or has been, acting in a

manner

prejudicial to

subversive to the authority of the lawfully

established government, irrespective of whether that person be within or without Malawi,

he

may by

order published in the Gazette, declare such person to be subject to forfeiture.

64

Judicial

Independence

is

an important principle which ensures the safeguard of rights

in

western

it

17

procedures, tenure and termination of judgeship. Before even considering tliese issues
pertinent to note

is

Malawi
part

that the colonial judiciary,

which was the

role

judiciary, played a very limited role in government. In fact,

of administration and

it

was viewed

an instrument to

as

model
it

it

for the first

was regarded

facilitate

as

colonial

administration.

The

Judiciary under the

which was the highest

in the hierarchy, the

Supreme Court had only

High Court

the

general jurisdiction over

High court and Subordinate

(

if

any

)

as

may

,

such

be prescribed by Parliament, and the other

for the time being holding office

criminal and civil matters.

and such number of judges, not being

The

courts.

appellate jurisdiction and consisted of the Chief Justice

number of justices of appeal
judges of

Republic consisted of the Supreme Court of Appeal

first

less than

It

two, as

.

The High Court had

consisted of the Chief Justice

may be

prescribed by or under

any written law.
Section 63 (1) of 1966 constitution conferred on the president the power to appoint
the Chief Justice.

Such appointment was not subject

to confirmation

by any other body.

Furthermore the President had powers to appoint the other judges after consultation with
the

Commission

Service

Judicial

under Article 63(2) of the Constitution. This

systems.

constitutional

supra, note 21 at 57.

^^MAL. CONST. (1966)
^

^

V
V

69

Art.67 (2) (a) (b)

Art.

62

(

cap. vi.

c).

(2).

Cf the Nigerian

to confirmation

Constitution of 1960 Section 211(1) which

made

the Chief Justice appointment subject

by a simple majority of the Senate.

This was established under Art. 71 of the Constitution and
chaired by the Chief Justice.

Its

task

was

it

was supposed

to balance the legal ability,

to be an independent

body

temperament, courage, integrity and

18

amounted

appointments in the hands of the president, since

to placing the judicial

appeared to give him power to ignore the advice of the Commission.

it

This method

established a fertile ground for political considerations in the appointing process since
the president could hardly be expected to appoint people,

views on matters of public policy were known
In addition to this, the other
Judicial Service

weakness

to

be radically different from his own.

Commission. As pointed out above, the Chief

the Public Service

Commission

of appeal or judge as

may

72

who was

the composition of the

Justice,

also a presidential appointee

for the time being

who was

a sole

the persons serving in the

arrangement

in the

Not only

Commission was vested

Commission

casts doubt

was not conducive
judiciary

this,

but the

power

in the president too.

to

remove

Such an

on the independence of the body from

political influence, especially executive control. In

the judiciary

and such justice

be designated in that behalf by the president

acting after consultation with the Chief Justice.

was a

was

in the process

nominee, was the Chairman. The other members included the chairman of

presidential

result

however outstanding, whose

to the attainment

fact the

whole appointing process

to

of an independent judicial body. The

which was more sympathetic

to the

governmental policies of the

day.

The provisions

for tenure

and termination of judgeship were contained under

Section 64 of the Constitution. The retirement age was 62, but the president had wide

social

respectability of a prospective appointee.

71

Cf.. S.61(2)

of the Constitution of Kenya which empowered the president to appoint puisne judges

acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

^^

MAL. CONST,

art.

87.

supra, note 70.

^''mAL.

CONST.

Art. 72(1).

1^

where he considered

discretion to retain a judge

Again,

this brings in the issue

empowered

the president to

of

is

political considerations. In addition, Article

remove any judge from

office

64

(3)

where he considered

This gave the president extreme power of

desirable in the public interest.

dismissal which

"

desirable in the public interest.

it

it

summary

not commensurate with a democratic society.

Similarly, the president could also transfer a person holding the office of judge to

any other office
interest.

which

where he considered

in the public service

These provisions implied

in turn gravely affected the

The Court's

position

was

that there

was no

it

desirable in the public

security of tenure for the judges,

independence of the judiciary.

weakened by

further

the fact that there

was no provision
•70

in the Constitution guaranteeing the protection

such salaries

of the salaries of the judges.

public servants.

arising directly

common law

tradition

of

all

of judicial immunity, for any action

from the performance of their function.

The wording was too broad and

liable to

meet a certain standard of proficiency which
body which sets and applies the standard.

to

that

due

to the loose

80

But

it is

worthwhile to mention

be abused.

The other grounds were misbehavior and incompetence

Note

just like the salaries

made

Despite these anomalies, the judges enjoyed a limited measure of

independence under the

Article 64 (4).

body

subject to the control of the legislative

This

the latter

in turn brings

too broad and

is

may

suggest a failure

back the issue of the independence of the

wording of this provision

it

could be utilized to achieve

political goals.

78

Cf. with the 1960 Constitution of Nigeria

protecting the judges from the
79

salaries

on the Consolidated Fund thereby

legislative bodies.

This was a colonial legacy whereby courts were seen as part of administration and therefore were not

really distinguishable

80

which charged such

whims of the

from the public service

Lord Denning explained the common law

The words which he speaks

i.e

see supra text on p. 15.

tradition in the following fashion:

are protected

by an absolute

privilege.

The orders which he

and the sentences which he imposes, cannot be made the subject of civil proceedings
against him. No matter that the judge was under some gross error or ignorance, or was
gives,

actuated by envy, hatred or malice and

all

uncharitableness, he

is

not liable to an action.

The

20
that this

immunity extended

only and could not shield

it

from

Having considered the
only logical to look

civil suits

to

from parties aggrieved by the court's decisions

political pressure.

factors that helped

weaken

the status of the judiciar>%

was entrusted

at the residual role that the court

with. There

it

is

was no

provision either expressly or Impliedly in the constitution giving the court the power of

pronounce on the constitutionality of the acts of the other coordinate

judicial review to

branches of government. Moreover, Article 2 (2) operated as a further disability for the
courts because

gave the government unlimited powers.

it

only supervisory jurisdiction over criminal and
82

and

the Constitution

from the subordinate courts and

Hence, the High Court had

matters by virtue of Article 70 of

civil

power of judicial review was

its

81

restricted to decisions

to administrative actions

and decisions of lesser officers

of the executive branch or persons charged with the performance of public

reason

is

not because the judge has any privilege to

make mistakes

or to do wrong.

that he should be able to do his duty with complete independence and free from

Sirros v
81

Moore

3 All

emanating

It is

fear.

This

acts.

so

See

E.R. 776 (1974)

Supra note 62.
,

82

Note the Courts position was

Act

in

frirther

criminal jurisdiction

in capital

the Local Courts

offenses like murder, manslaughter and treason. This

of an alleged lack of confidence
Phiri

weakened when Parliament enacted

had

it

in the judiciary as is

was

was any loophole

in this field

at all in

our government

in

as a result

Mr

Khofi

the eyes of the ordinary villager...

of the judiciary system where something was

still

required to be done to

prove to the villagers that the government was there for there protection
criminals have been

prove their guilty
that these courts

Cultural Relativism

were

let free

for the

mere reason

that there

was not

....

many ,many

sufficient evidence to

"
later

used to deal with political opponents. See Jack Donnelly

and Universal Human

(Suggesting that the only possible appeal
83

came about

evidenced by the parliamentary debates.

this to say:

"Sir, if there

Note

(Amendment)

1969 which created a sophisticated form of Traditional Courts and gave these courts exclusive

Rights,

Human

in the traditional

,

Rights Quarterly, 400, 412
court

was

to the

head of state).

This position was borrowed from the British. See Michael Superstone and James Gourdie, JUDICIAL

REVIEW

24 (1992)

(

describing judicial review as "the process by which the High Court exercises

its

supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies

who

carry out quasi-judicial functions or

who

are charged with the

performance of public

acts").

21

was exercised by

jurisdiction

prohibition, and

Not
since
(2).

it

was regulated by

it

and rules of court.

statute

surprisingly, even this limited

mandamus

certiorari

,

and

84

power of judicial review was only

theoretical

could be overridden any time by the government due to the existence of Article 2

The end

which

the prerogative of the writs of

result

in turn

was

was

that the judiciary

was just a rubber stamp of the

legislative

body

controlled by the executive.

Attempts At Safeguarding

ii)

Human

Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights had a powerful influence on new
African State constitutions. In fact
colonialism

challenge
guarantees.
rights

As

a result

which generally
In

as

was used

violation

a

many

post

as a tool

by many African leaders

of internationally

bill

colonial African countries

of rights was rejected

Government and

the People of

rightly observed, the language appeared to be

acknowledge the existence of individual
88

Malawi

in

favor of constitutional

shall continue to recognize

more a

53 and the Statute

Law

(

at

(2) in the provisions.

The

relevant

Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.

324.

gz

See the constitutions of Burundi (1962); Cameroon (1961) and Senegal (1963).
87

Art.

2(1)

(iii).

Mordene, id

As Mordene

rights than a formal constitutional guarantee to

85

Mordene, supra, note 34

87

reflection of governmental intent to

Further this recognition of individual rights

by the inclusion of subsection

RSC Ord

rights

incorporated bills of

the sanctity of the personal liberties enshrined in the United Nations.

protect those rights.

human

recognized

to

reflected the Declaration.

Malawi, a national

declaration that the

it

See also Modeme, supra, note 34.

was rendered
words

useless

in this Article

22

were
the
that

any governmental action done by the authority of

that a court could not hold that

law was inconsistent or

of Article 2(1).

in contravention

any law passed by parliament, whether

it

was good

89

Consequently, this meant

or bad,

was not challengeable

in

court as this provision completely barred such action.

Hence with such a background

in

mind,

it is

not surprising that there

disregard of human rights on the part of the government and this
fact that

Malawi was a one party

became a cause

state.

for draconian behavior.

The
It

was wanton

was made worse by

the

desire to ensure the success of the party

inevitably led to a severe curtailment of rights

and freedoms.

89

90

This was a great disability for the courts.

A

good example

is

the Local Courts

(Amendment) Act discussed under note 80 which barred

legal

representation in these courts though they were handling capital offences.
91

The

legislature

legislative

form

was turned

into a

committee of the ruling party,

to decisions already taken

its

function

becoming

that

of giving

by the party's national Executive Committee.

92

Such freedoms included freedom of assembly and
against discrimination based on political grounds.

association,

freedom of expression, and freedom

CHAPTER II

THE US MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The power of the

courts to determine the constitutionality of the acts of the other

coordinate branches of government

is

an established component of the American system

of govemment.^^ This power affords the citizens protection against the infringement of
fundamental rights by governmental authority. The practice for the courts has been to
use the Bill of Rights as a yardstick for measuring the constitutionality of governmental

However no such power

action.

constitutions.

How did the

is

expressly granted by the federal nor the state

courts get this

power? As Horace Davis would argue there

is

no logical necessity why the opinion of the judiciary, one of the three branches of the
government, should override the action of the coordinate branches of government;^''

hence

it is

imperative to discuss the source of this power before considering

its

nature

and scope.

A) Source Of The Federal Courts Power Of Judicial Review

The power of judicial review
case

93

Marbury

of

Note

vs.

that over the years this

JUDICIAL VETO

(

in the

Madison.^^

power has been

NY, Da Capo

U.

The

S.

Courts was established in the landmark

brief

facts

were

that

the subject of extensive debate. See

William

Horace

A

Marbury,

Davis,

THE

Press).

''Vat p2-3.
'^

5

US

(

1

Cranch

)

137, 2 L.

Ed 60

(1803); See David

J.

Berderman, Political Questions / Judicial

Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? Thomas F. Franck, 7 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 693,
694 (1993) ( suggesting that "Marbury vs Madson is the locus classicus of judicial review, and hence of

American

constitutional order").

23

24

was one of the people who was named
during

a justice of the peace for the District of

minute judicial appointments

last

at

the close of the Federalist

The Jefferson Administration which

of President John Adams.

Administration

This was

in 1801.

the Federalists chose to disregard those appointments for

succeeded

Columbia

which formal

commissions had not been delivered before the end of Adams' term. Marbury and others

went

directly to the

Supreme Court

commissions by moving the court

to

compel the Secretary of

to issue a writ

of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a basis for the

right to his

powers

judicial

affirmative

on

assigned by

96

The court

in the courts

to certain legal

relied

on Article

The

first

question

this the court

and constitutional
3

was whether
had

to decide

restraints that the

of the Constitution which vests the

and extends such powers

to all cases in finding in the

Furthermore, the court stressed that where a specific duty

this point.

law, and individual rights depends

seems equally

American

issues.

commission. In order to determine

whether the executive was subject
judiciary could enforce.

of mandamus. They invoked Section 13

direct route.

The court was faced with a number of
Marbury had a

State to deliver the

clear, that the individual

who

upon the performance of

that duty,

constitutional order").

The Judiciary Act

establishes the judicial courts of the

US

and authorizes the Supreme Courts "to issue

holding office, under the authority of the US".
97

Article

.

III

(1) reads as follows: (1)

court,

.

and

in

"The judicial power of the United

such inferior courts as the Congress

may from

States, shall

be vested

one

in

time to time ordain and established

(2) states that

The judicial power

shall

extend to

all

cases, in

Law and

Equity, arising under this

Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
their authority
all

;-

which

shall

to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers

be made, under

and Consuls;- to

cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United states

shall be a Party

However

it

considers himself injured, has a right to

writs of mandamus in cases warranted by principles of usages of, to any courts appointed, or persons

supreme
." and

is

note that the court conceded that there are

executive acts due to what has

become

to be

known

some

instances

where the court cannot review

as the "political question doctrine". see infra

p50

25
go

resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

emphasizing the importance of its role

The other
the

issue before the court

Supreme Court

paragraph of Article
In

all

(2)

of individual

in the safeguarding

was whether a

writ of

of

in a case involving the Secretary

III

words the court was

In other

rights.

mandamus could

state

in light

issue in

of the second

which provides as follows:

cases affecting

and Consuls, and those

Supreme court

shall

Ambassadors, other public Ministers
in

which a

state shall

be a party, the

have original jurisdiction. In

all

the cases

before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to

Law and

Fact, with such Exceptions,

and under such Regulations as the Congress

The

court found that the authority conferred to the

Act of 1789

to issue writs

Supreme Court by

of mandamus to public officers was

Hence

provisions of the Constitution just quoted above.
the Judiciary Act to be unconstitutional

This Constitution, and the

shall

shall

Laws of the United

state to the

the judicial department to say

States

all treaties

Contrary notwithstanding

what the law

Marbury, Supra, note 94. Note also

the

provides thus:

which

made, or

be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Further, the court explained that "It

The Act gave

It

be made, under the authority of the United States,

Laws of any

99

with the

be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every

state shall

98

in direct conflict

on the basis of Article VI of the Constitution

be made in pursuance thereof; and

which

the Judiciary

the court found Section 13 of

which establishes the supremacy of the Federal Constitution.

shall

make.

shall

Supreme Court

that the Bill

is

is"

.

emphatically the province and the duty of

and therefore

of Rights

is

entrenched

original jurisdiction in an area

if

two laws

in the

US

conflict with

Constitution.

where the Constitution conferred only

appellate jurisdiction

This statement has become the pillar which legitimize the courts' power of judicial review.

26

The

each other the courts must decide on the operation of each.

Marbury

in

vs.

Madison

have estabhshed the

done

it is

US Model

is

a diffuse model

characteristic is that the jurisdiction to

limited to a single court.

power

exercise this

And Scope

A

involving "incidental" review.

engage

exercised

It is

to

in ordinary litigation.

B) Nature

The

expounded

powers of judicial review

courts'

The legitimacy

over coordinate branches of government.
derives from the fact that

US

principles

key

in constitutional interpretation is not

by both

state

and federal courts, and

it

is

regarded as an inherent and normal incident of the process of case adjudication.'^^ Thus,
in the

words of de Tocqueville's: "An American Court can only adjudicate when there

is litigation; it

1

invoked."

07

deals with only a particular case, and

Review by

'°'see Archibard Cox,

the court, therefore

it

final authority

its

jurisdiction

is

gives a judgement limited in principle to

,

THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

Court assumed responsibility as the

cannot act until

38 (1987)

(

explaining that "the Supreme

on the interpretation of the Constitution without

express Constitutional support.")

„„
Supra note 89

'02 „

103

Owen M.

Fiss,

Introductory Remarks: Independent Judiciary, 19 Yale

suggesting that "though the

US Supreme

an on going basis, the court has a long and noble history and knows that
structure of the

J Int'l

L 219 (1994)

(

Court confronts doubts as to the legitimacy of judicial review on

government and the minds of the American

it

has a secure place

in

both the

citizenry").

104

All the courts involve in constitutional adjudication in the ordinary course of litigation.

Cf. with the centralized system

which

is

called the

European model and

is

characterized by the

existence of a special court, with exclusive jurisdiction of constitutional rulings. This model originated in

Austria where such a court was created

The American Model has
107

Alexis de Tocquelle,

De

la

in

the Austrian Constitution of 1920.

also been adopted

by Canada,

democratic en Amerique

,

Australia, India

and Japan.

1835, collection 10/18 (Paris: 1963),p 78. This

model where the constitutionality of a law is examined in the
abstract. See Louis favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD ( Louis Henkin & Arbort
Rosenthal eds, 990 ) ( explaining that the reason for accommodating such abstract review is due to the
fact that constitutional issues are generally raised by the public authority ie the government members of

contrasts sharply with the European

1

,

27

by the Supreme Court has general

the particular facts of the case, although a decision

binding authority for the lower courts.

The

ability

of a court to be able to prevent the arbitrary exercise of government

power involves a number of factors and
of the judiciary". '^^ This leads us
constitutional safeguards

it is

heavily contingent upon the "independence

to the other

important element of the

which ensure the independence of the

US

model; the

judiciary. Larkins has

defined "judicial independence" as follows:
Judicial Independence refers to the existence

are not manipulated for political

of judges

who

who are impartial
who form a judicial

gain,

toward the parties of a dispute, and

branch which has the power as an institution to regulate the
legality

of government behavior, enact

'neutral' justice,

and

determine significant constitutional and legal values.

The attainment of such a

status

is

largely influenced

by the following

factors; the

appointment procedures, tenure, termination procedures, and compensation of judges.

These

in turn influence

the exercise of the

power of judicial review by

the courts.

parliament, and not by individuals).
108

Note

under the European Model the effect of the decision

that

absolute. See Favoreu

id,

(

"when

stating that

a

is

erga omnes,

unconstitutional, his act has the effect of annulling the act, of making
is

no longer

in force;

it

i.e.

applicable to

all,

European constitutional judge declares an act
it

disappear fi-om the legal order.

It

has no further legal effect for anybody, and sometimes the ruling of

unconstitutionality operates retroactively").
109

Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization:

Analysis, 44
•10,

,

Id. at

61

Am.

J.

Comp.

L. 605,

A

Theoretical

and Conceptual

606 (1996).

1.

Note, however that there are other internal factors which
judge, for example, where a judge

is

committed

may

erode the independence of an individual

to an ideology, or to a particular faith to such extent that

he forfeits the ability to do justice with that moderate degree of impartiality. See Ninian M. Stephen,
Judicial Independence- a Fragile Bastion, in

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE

DEBATE

).

(Shetreet and Deschenes eds, 1985

"^SUPREME COURT

POLITICS:

Thomas G. Krattenmaker
is

largely affected

THE INSTITUTION AND

eds 1994)

(

ITS

CONTEMPORARY

PROCEDURES 49

explaining that "the kind and quality of the

by the character and

ability

(Susan L. Bloch and

US Supreme

Court work

of the justices themselves"). See also Larkins, supra, note

28
Article

Section 2 provides that the president "shall nominate

II,

Advice and Consent

of the Senate

shall appoint

.

.

.

,

and by and with the

Judges of the Supreme court".

participation in the appointing process by the senate requires a simple

The

Scholars have noted that this gives the Senate two distinct roles "an advisory

'

vote.

majority

role before the nomination has occurred

and a reviewing function

The

after the fact".

above clause assumes a joint deliberative process concerning the composition of the
court and this in turn prevents presidential
to a lack

monopoly of the process which "might lead

of qualified" and "diffused" appointees, and

to patronage

and corruption and

also to "insufficient attentiveness to the interest of different groups".
1

therefore, brings

and the

109

(

1

between the executive

legislature.

explaining that "without independence, the judiciary can be easily manipulated to prevent

questioning
113

about a healthy form of checks and balances

This process,

illegal or arbitrary acts

of

it

from

state actors").

Emphasis added.

114

US

Const,

art. II,

S

2.

See also Bloch and Krattenmaker eds,

id

(

Noting that

in

addition to the

American Bar Association plays an important role in the appointing
process by investigating and evaluating Supreme Court nominees put forward by the president through its
Standing Committee on the Judiciary)
constitutionally prescribed actors, the

'''id

& Cass

and Confirmation Process 101 Yale
L. J. 1491, 1495. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Considerations of Supreme Court
Nominees, 79 Yale L.J. 657 (1970) ( Arguing that "constitutional considerations demand enhanced
senatorial scrutiny when giving advice and consent to judicial, as opposed to executive branch
David A. Strauss

R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution

nominees").

Strauss and Sunstein, /c/at 1496.

1

18

Note

that

even the framers were greatly concerned with preventing presidential monopoly. See The

Federalist No. 76, at

457

(

Alexander Hamilton stressing

that "the president

was bound

to

submit the

propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body").

'

'^See

Mackay and Parkinson

in

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE

(Shetreet and Deschenes eds 1985)
there

is little

(

suggesting that this process

that the political branches can

do

to control the

is

judge

CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

367

highly political, but that nevertheless,
in

day- to- day work).

29

While

state

and

are essential elements of the United States judicial

local courts

system, the federal courts are the more celebrated division of that system and are treated

embodiment of

as the fullest

explain, the

Article

US

can "boast of the

life

Fiss

would

of the federal courts and point to

political insularity

of the Constitution, providing

III

As

the ideal of judicial independence.

tenure and protection against diminution of

pay, as the essential guarantor of independence."

122

•

Article

III

provides in pertinent part:

"the Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during

good Behavior, and

shall, at stated

which

their Services,

shall not be

Times, receive for their services, a Compensation for

diminished during their Continuance in Office."

clear that the protection against diminution of salary

It is

against political control.

However many
125

about the

life

causes should hold office for
the body".

120

Note

As

tenure provisions.

The Constitution

an important bulwark

have expressed reservations

legal scholars

Aristotle pointed out, "that judges of important

disputable thing, for the

life is

is

most

states

and

as well as

by ensuring that the work of

further insulates the judiciary

that the Judges to these courts are elected in

mind grows old

this

makes them

directly accountable

to their constituencies.
121

Owen M.

Fiss,

122

See

Fiss, id.

The Limits ofJudicial Independence, 25 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev 57,60 (1993).

Cf Henry Monaghan

,

The Confirmation Process:

1202, (challenging Halmitons arguements for
relieves a judge of the incetive to please
their continuation in office does not

is

life

Law or Politics?

101 Harv. L. Rev.

tenure in the federalist No. 78 and arguing that "what

not the prospect of indefinite service, but the awareness that

depend on securing the approval of the

political

branches" and

therefore that "independence can be achieved by mandating fixed, nonrenewable terms of service").

'^^

U.S.

124

CONST,

However

the

art III, s

art. Ill

1.

provisions leaves judges subject to inflationary pressure. See Atkins

2d 1028 (Ct.C1.1977), cert, denied, 434
violated the art. Ill Compensation clause by failing to
States,

rate

of

556

F.

inflation). See also Fiss, supra, note 121, at

US

1009 (1978)

(

v.

United

holding that Congress had not

raise judicial salaries

an amount equivalent to the

63 (suggesting that "a decision by Congress or the

President to hold judicial salaries constant in the face of spiraling inflation can act as a severe sanction").
125
is

See Monaghan, supra, note 122

doubtful that

many

(

arguing further that the Courts workload

is

very heavy, and that

octogenarians would be able to devote the energy necessary to the task").

"it

30

the federal judiciary can not be easily revised by the political branches. Thus, the courts
constitutional decisions can only be revised through a

cumbersome amendment

special majority in each house of Congress,

which requires

fourths of the states

.

Hence

and approval by three

Article v provides:

The Congress whenever two

of both houses

thirds

Amendments

necessary, shall propose

it

process,

shall

deem

to this Constitution,

on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing

or,

Amendments, which,

in either case,

shall

be valid to

all

when

Intents

and Purposes, as part of

ratified

by the legislatures of three fourths of the several

states, or

by Conventions

or the other

Not only

of

Constitution,

in three fourths thereof, as the

one

may proposed by

the

Ratification

127

r^

Congress

Mode

this

.

.

these, but also the

removal procedure from federal judicial office

is rigid.

Judges can only be removed from judicial office through the impeachment process

which requires

the concurrence of the

two

thirds majority

of the members present.

This requirement ensures security of tenure for the federal judges. The

been enhanced by the evolution of broad cultural understandings
judiciary

impeachment

political

Though

control.

in the Congress,

By way of

it.

129

from

it

the

that further insulate the

Constitution

vests

the

power of

does not specify the permissible grounds for invoking

illustration. Article III

speaks in the most general

judges "shall hold their Offices during good behavior", and Article

1

procedure has

terms, providing that
II

section 4 provides

"yft

Note

that in case

of statutory interpretations, these can be easily reversed by a simple majority of

Congress with the concurrence of the President. See William N. Eskridge,
Statutory Interpretation Decisions. 101

'^^U.S.

U.S.

CONST,
CONST,

art

V.

art 1, sec 3 par.6.

129
Fiss, supra, note 121 at 6

1

YALE

1.

J.

331 (1991).

Jr.,

Overriding Supreme Court

31

for the

impeachment of

all

of the United States for high Crimes and

civil officers

Misdemeanors.

As

Fiss rightly notes, an understanding has developed

whereby "a judge can be

impeached and removed only for violation of the most elemental duties of office, such as
corruption or conviction of a crime not because the legislature disagrees with the judge

on the merits of some decision."

Other American legal scholars have further

buttressed their argument that the federal judiciary

by

referring to a

few dramatic cases

is

independent from political pressure

which the Supreme Court defied the executive or

in

the legislature.

An

earliest

example include the decision of the court declaring

Truman's seizure of the nations

was

1969 when the court issued an order

in

newly re-elected

Adam

requiring President

U.S.

during the Korean war.

steel mills

CONST,

Clayton Powell

Nixon

art II s

;

to

to seat a

and also the court's controversial decision

4 provides: "The President and
for,

Another instance

Congress requiring the House

to surrender secret tapes

removed from Office on Impeachment

illegal President

of his conversations.'^^

all civil

and Conviction

of,

in light

It is

Officers of the United States, shall be

Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and

Misdemeanors".

Fiss, supra, note 121 at 61. See also

Integrity

suggesting that

rJote that

where
rights

it

Mark A. Hutchson, Maintaining Public Confidence

of the Judiciary: State Bar of Nevada

it

in

is

recent years

,

federal judges

V.

in the

Claiborne, B.Y.U.L.REV283, 283-284 (1989)

(

have been impeached for tax fraud, bribery and perjury).

easy to counter argue that the court

is

not really independent by looking at the cases

refused to decide cases by invoking 'the Political Question Doctrine' even though constitutional

were involved. See

infra, text

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
'^""powell V.

on pages 50-53.

v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486

(1969).

'^^United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

32

of these constitutional measures

that the federal

hefty measure of political independence, and ably protect

C.

Under

this

jurisdictional

and proceed
the

will therefore look at the

do the courts conduct

How

do the

interpretivism
specific

US

govern the exercise of the Federal Courts

methods of constitutional interpretation
governing

Method

constitutional adjudication in

What system of judicial review have

of Constitutional Interpretation

courts approach a constitutional question?

method or the non

first

138

interpretivism one?

method? Throughout history the

historical

1

that

their business?

the courts developed over the years?

i.

137

rights.

attempt to discuss the contemporary substantive, and

to discuss the jurisdictional rules

How

US.

we

human

are able to enjoy a

Framework Of Judicial Review

and procedural ground rules

We

authority.

subtopic

US

judges in the

meaning of the language

US

What

is

Do

the courts use the

the basis for adopting the

have consulted

courts

in the text, the structure

the plain or

of the Constitution as a

-1/:

These were designed by the founding fathers

to create an independent federal judiciary to serve as an

"excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body" and as "the bulwarks

of limited constitution against

legislative

encroachments". See The Federalist, No. 78, pp. 522, 526,

respectively.
137

Note

that the structural

structure

independence

and jurisdiction of

Salzberger,

A

is

not a complete one. See U.S.

inferior federal courts to the discretion

CONST,

Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, or

Independent Judiciary? 13

Int'I

Rev. L.

& Econ.

349, 355 (1993)

(

art. Ill

which leaves the

of the Legislature. See also
:

Eli

M.

Why Do We Have an

arguing along the same

lines).

For a

Human Rights by the Supreme Court, see, Archibald Cox,
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91 (1966).

discussion of cases involving the promotion of

138

This seeks to cover the following questions:
the

norms derived from

normative content

is

.To what extent do the

1

the written constitution as

opposed

to principles

not readily available in the constitution?

constitutional adjudication? 2.

When may

behest? 4. At what stages of a dispute?

5.

the

US

As

to

What

US judges

confine themselves to

of liberty and justice whose

are the appropriate circumstances for

federal courts decide constitutional issues? 3.

what issues?

At whose

33

whole, the intent of the drafters, purposes sought to be achieved by the provision and the

deeply held values or notions of social policy

in

constitutional

adjudication.

A

combination of all the above interpretive methods have progressively led the country to
develop the non-interpretive form of judicial review. This means that in reviewing laws
or acts for constitutionality the judges do not confine themselves to determining whether
conflict with

those laws or acts

norms derived from the written Constitution but they

also enforce principles of liberty and justice even

principles are not available in the Constitution.

where the normative content of such

This

is

despite the fact that the courts

lack the express textual mandate from the Constitution to decide constitutional issues.

This form of judicial review

is

well demonstrated

in

most of the major cases

decided by the courts over the years. The most prominent ones being Roe

Furman

vs.

Baker

Georgia,

vs.

Carr,

and Brown

vs.

vs.

Wade,

Board of Education.

these cases reference to or analysis of the constitutional text plays a minor role.'

In
^

The

court relied heavily on large conceptions of governmental structure and individual rights

whose

content, as

Grey would argue,

is

scarcely specified in the written Constitution.'

Such conceptions include dual federalism, vested

rights, fair

procedure and equality

before the law.

139

Thomas

'%10 U.S.
''*'408

C. Grey,

Do We Have An

Unwritten Constitution, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703(1975).

13 (1973)

(

The arbortion

U.S. 238 (1972)

(

The death penalty

1

case).

case).

'''^369

U.S. 186 (1962).

'''^347

U.S. 483 (1954) (The segregation case).

144

Grey, supra, note 139.

'''id.

^

34

Fletcher

vs.

Peck provides a

fitting illustration

of

approach

this

in its early stages

of development. In that case, one of the alternative grounds given by the court for
striking

down

was

a Georgia statute

that

violated general principles

it

to our free institutions, particularly the principle

Ever

since, the courts has continuously

basis for

its

decisions in cases involving

which are

of the inviolability of vested

common
rights.

invoked the generalities of the Constitution as a

human

rights.

Thus

in

Shapiro

"was a constitutional

the Court concluded that "the right to travel"

vs.

Thompson,

right

though the

court has no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to ... a particular constitutional
provision".'"*^ Equally, in

Roe

vs.

Wade,

the

Court was able to find "the right to

privacy" in the text of the Constitution. The Court stated that;

The

right of privacy,

whether

it

be founded in the Fourteenth

Amendments concept of personal
state action, as

we

feel

it is,

liberty

and

restrictions

or, as the district

upon

court

determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
to the people, its

broad enough to encompass a woman's

decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

Grey has defined the Court's reference
in this case as strikingly casual.

Justice

Blackmun's opinion

"

Some

to the textual

cover for the right to privacy

scholars have even gone further and described

for the court as dreadful.

''*^10US(6Cranch)87(1810).
'"^^394

US

^^^H

at

618 (1969).

630.

Supra, note 140.

•>atl53.
'^'Grey,5M/7ra note 139,

'^^See C. Black,

at

708-709.

DECISION ACCORDING TO

Interpretation. 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033 (1981).

LAW

81 (1981); See also Sandalow, Constitutional

35

A

been advanced

number of arguments have

form of judicial

to justify this

review. Brest has explained that;
the text of the

provisions

are

Constitution
treated

original understanding

as

is

is

authority

but most of

The
more

open textured.

inherently

its

also important, but judges are

concerned with the adopters' general purposes than with their
intentions in a very precise way.

Are the courts

justified in approaching constitutional questions in this

Chief Justice Marshall attempted

Maryland,

where the

state

manner?

of McCulloch

to explain the rationale in the case

vs.

argued unsuccessfully that the "necessary and proper"

clause authorized only legislation "indispensable" to executing the enumerated powers.

He

stated that the

word "necessary"

as used in the

common

approved authors, frequently imports no more than
useful, or useful or essential to another.

human

He

further

that

added

language, that no word conveys to the mind, in

affairs

of the world, or

in the

one thing

is

convenient, or

"such

is

the character of

that

all situations,

one single definite

idea".'^^

Brest has interpreted Marshall's statement to

without regard to

its

linguistic

mean

that

"any reading of a provision

and social contexts will either yield unresolvable
1

indeterminances of language or just nonsense."

CO

Hence, the Courts in interpreting the

Constitution always attempt to conform their decisions to the prevailing conditions and

Paul Brest, The Misconcived Quest for The Original Understanding

THEORY: A READER ( Garvey and
*^''l7

U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

'^^Art

I

sec 8 of the

'^V

at

413.

'"m

at

414.

Supra, note 137.

US CONST.

in

MORDEN CONSTITUTIONAL

Aleinikoff eds, West Publishing Co., 1991) 60.
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the deeply held values

in the society

because that

is

the only

review because of the wording of the Ninth Amendment.
of certain

rights, shall not

by the people".

retained

to achieve practical

Courts are justified in adopting such an open form of judicial

results. In addition, the

the Constitution

way

Impliedly,

It

states:

"The enumeration

in

be construed to deny or disparage others
framers permitted whoever deals with

the

by the society

constitutional issues to take into account other values held

in

determining

violations of fundamental rights.

The advantage of
changing needs of

form of judicial review

this

the society because

creating a "living Constitution".

government

in the

name of

And

it

adapts easily to the

has a very important characteristic that of

it

its

that

is

best element

basic rights, and yet at the

is

that the provisions restrain

same time due

to unspecifity,

permit the judiciary to elucidate the development and change in the content of those
rights over time.

ii.

The
of

and leaves

it

CONST.

.

to

The

but rather that

And

Its

Concepts

of the Constitution which provides the foundation

section of this

to set the size

provision

creates one

"Supreme Court"

and ordain and establish such

of the court

Ninth Amend.

it it

commands of the
id. (

first

Congress

See Grey supra note 139

Grey,

Justiciability Doctrine

starting point is Article III

this doctrine

'^^US

The

is

(

arguing that "the Ninth

Amendment

has no substantive content on

its

face

a license to to constitutional decision makers to look beyond the substantive

constitutional text to protect fundamental rights not expressed in the constitution").

suggesting that "the equal protection clause was meant originally to prohibit

state racial discrimination"

and

that "it

political rights but that the latter has

is

equally clear that the clause

was not intended

some forms of

to guarantee equal

only been possible because of the noninterpretive model of judicial

review").

Note
been
1

z:

that a

built

number of complex congressional

statutes

on the basis of the provisions of Article

and Supreme Court Rules and practices have

111.

T

U.S.

CONST,

art III, s

1

.

Note

that the

number of justices has been

set at nine since

1

869. Legal

37

may

inferior courts as

to

(i) all

be necessary. The second part extends the federal judicial power
law, concerning admiralty, or affecting foreign

cases arising under federal

ministers, and to controversies between certain parties, namely, the United States, states,

foreign nations, and their citizens in specified situations.

manner
court.

which

in

'^^

And

must

constitutional issues

the

courts have developed

Justiciability Doctrine

which

A good explanation of

arise if they are to

be addressed by the

number of concepts

a

limit the jurisdiction

is

govern the

found in Baker

vs.

Carr.

a three prong test in determining justiciability.

suggested that a court inquiring into justiciability must decide
asserted can be judicially identified [and (b)]

its

(a)

It

"whether the duty

breach judicially determined, [and

whether protection of the right asserted can be judicially molded".
the Article

to

of the Court.

the workings of the doctrine

down

In that case the court set

This provision dictates the

(c)]

In other words, if

requirements are not satisfied the court carmot take jurisdiction because

III

scholars have argued that the Congressional

power over

size

is

it

a potential source of political checks on the

Court.

'^"^U.S.CONST.

art. Ill s.2, cl.

1

(

emphasis added).

See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article HI: Perspectives on the Case or Controversy

Requirement

,

93 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1979) (explaining that "the case or controversy requirement which

also called the justiciability doctrine, includes

more

specialized notions of ripeness,

is

moomess, and

standing to sue, and prohibits constitutional considerations of issues except as a necessary incident to the
resolution of a concrete case

or controversy")

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
See, Note,

And Justiciability For AW^:

.

64-241

v.

2d

P.

Bator

et al

,

Hart Wechsler's

THE FEDERAL

ed. 1973).

Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of Powers, 109

Harv. L. Rev. 1066 (1996); See also, Brilmayer,

See Valley Forge Christian College

See also
(

id.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State 454 U.S.

464, 47 1( Justice Rehnquist stressing that the judicial review power "is not unconditioned authority to

determine the constitutionality of legislative

'^^369 U.S. 186
'''

Id

all

executive acts").
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doesn't have the power to do so,
issues

constitutional

even

and sometimes

it

may

decline to adjudicate

cases within the reach of Article

in

III

for prudential

171

reasons.

In Flast

vs.

Cohen,

justiciability doctrine.

He

Chief Justice Warren explained the rationale of the

stated that the requirement

limit the business

of federal courts to questions presented in

an adversary context and
capable of resolution
part those

of "cases" and "controversies";

in a

historically

viewed as

through the judicial process.

words define the

tripartite allocation

form

And

in

role assigned to the judiciary in a

of power to assure that the federal courts

will not intrude into areas

committed

government. Justiciability

is

to the other

branches of

employed to give
placed upon federal courts

the term of art

expression to this dual limitation

by the case and controversy doctrine.

The

central concepts of justiciability are usually elaborated in specific categories,

namely advisory opinions, standing,
questions.

Each of these

will be

ripeness, mootness, political

looked

at separately

and

it

and administrative

will be seen that the

same

concerns often can be found in the language of two or more of these categories.

170

See, e.g., Jenkins V. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 41 1,421 (1969)

court did not address the standing issue,

(

the court observing that although the lower

Supreme Court must since

it is

a question of subject matter

jurisdiction).

'^'See INS V. Chadha 103 S.Ct 2764 (1983).
'^^

392 U.S.

'^^M
174

83.

at 95.

For example

in

McCamey

v.

Ford Motor Co. 657

F.

2d 230, 233

(

the court stated that "standing

of the concept of justiciability which includes the questions of advisory opinions, mootness and
ripeness").

is

part

39

aa)

Under

The Rule Against Advisory Opinions

Two

U.S. federal legal system, advisory opinions are banned.

the

important questions

arise:

what are advisory opinions and what

These have been defined

advisory opinion ban?

of the highest court of state
or by the chief executive.

to questions

to

the source of

is

mean answers given by

the

the justices

of law submitted by the house of the legislature

Three different theories for the ban of such opinions have

developed: the separation of powers principle, the need for adverse parties in a concrete
case,

and

1

Supreme Court.
he

fiirther

Professor Bickel called these theories the passive virtues of

finality.
77

Apart from arguing that the judicial power was limited by

suggested that "the courts

the abstract, " and that the court

may make no pronouncements

"may

its

the

nature,

in the large

and

in

give no opinions, even in a concrete case, which

power of ultimate disposition of

are advisory because they are not finally decisive, the

the case having been reserved elsewhere".
It

worthwhile to note that the court established the rule against advisory

is

opinions as

early

Washington with

1793 when the justices declined to help President George

as

legal assistance in dealing with

what was considered an issue of major

See Richard W. Westling Advisory Opinions and the Constitutionally Required
,

Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 379(1988)

(

Adequate

explaining that "the ban

goes to the core of the legitimacy of the Supreme Court both as an institution and

in its

is

a rule that

exercise of judicial

review")

Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1302 (1956). See also
Westling,

id, at

395

(

explaining that in such a situation "no Article

111

case exists.

No

law

suit

has been

commenced, and no parties are adverse" and that "the precise reason for the dialogue between the
Supreme court and a coordinate branch of government whether legislative or executive is to secure

the

advice of the court on the statute or action contemplated").

'^^A. Bickel,

THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF

POLITICS,

111-198 (2d ed 1986).
1

78
/i/ at

114-115. Note that Bickel believed that these ideas were central to the reasoning

Madison.

in

Marbury

vs.

40
national concern, America's neutrality toward the

on going war between England and

France.''^ In adopting this position the court had the following to say:
three departments of

the government [being] in certain

respects checks upon each

other,

and our being judges of a

court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong

arguments

against

the

of

propriety

deciding the questions alluded

our

extrajudicially

especially as the

to,

given by the constitution to the president, of calling

power
on the

heads of departments for opinions, seems to have been
purposely

well

as

as

expressly

united

the

to

executive

departments.

Apparently, the earliest concerns of the court in turning
1

request

was

to protect the principle

would undermine

Nevertheless,

principle.

Bickel would

as

allowing advisory opinions relying on Art.

He
179

states that if the

as

that are final

Ill

by robbing

"is

of the

lines

to

the

impermissibility

of

Marbury Case.

deduced from the obligation of the

& Wechsler, FEDERAL COURTS 65-67 (3d ed.,

See Hart and Welchsler,
to because

of the power

limitations can be found in

power of judicial review

180

it

to the case or controversy

suggest,

The presidents request and some of the questions accompanying

reprinted in Hart

and a fear that such action

opposed

later

the presidents

on

of separation of powers

the independence of the judiciary

pronounce judicial decisions

down

it,

and the justices refusal are

1988).

Chief Justice Jay declined to decide extrajudicially the questions alluded

id, (

of separation drawn by the constitution between the three departments of the

government).
181

The importance of pronouncing judicial decisions

to revision

by either the executive or the

legislature

US) 408 (1792) where justices had refused
on the ground

The court explained

and by an officer

in

that judicial actions

that

some authors argue

US

power which

103 (194 8)

an older case:

(

1992)

(

(

is

and not subject

Haybums

,

2 Dall (2

of War

of a judicial

it

deemed such

action "radically

vested in the court". See also C.

&

S.

indorsing the same principle).

that the principle against advisory opinions derives

See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalising

Rev. 603, 644

in

might be "revised and controuled by the

the executive department" and that

Air Lines v Waterman Corp., 333

ivlote

final rather than tentative,

to certify eligible pension claimants to the Secretary

inconsistent with the independence of the judicial

intent.

were

that the statute authorizing such proceedings improperly assigned duties not

nature to the courts.
legislature,

that

was expressed

Justiciability:

from the framers

The Example ofMootness, 105 Harv. L.

suggesting that "the advisory opinion doctrine has a constitutionally- mandated

core and a large prudential curtilage").

41

courts to decide cases conformably to law", as Chief Justice Marshal argued, then Article
Ill's

extension of

exercise of the

the

"judicial

power

endorsed by the court

power

to the confines

much

.

.

.

arising under this Constitution limits the

This was further

of a constitutional case".

Hence,

later in Flast case.

banned from deciding issues arising out of a controversy

the U.S. Federal Courts are

that

is

not real or in which the

parties are not adverse.

In addition the ban precludes the court from
are "abstract, hypothetical or contingent".
justified

strictly

by the

failure

making pronouncements on

issues that

These prohibitions, which are clearly

of a case to satisfy the requirements of

article III jurisdiction are

observed by the court and used to buttress the argument against advisory
1

87

opinions.

As

Justice

(

then Professor) Frankfurter stated

"Every

tendency to deal

with constitutional questions abstractly, to formulate them in terms of barren legal
1

questions, leads to dialects, to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities".

88
It is

on the

basis of the issues discussed above that advisory opinions are not permitted in the

US

federal legal system.

183

Bickel

,

supra, note 177,

184

See the Flast case, supra, note 172 (suggesting that issues should be presented
185

See Flast

id.

See also South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. V.

in

an adversary context).

Amador Medean Gold Mining

Co., 145

U.S. 300, 301 (1982).
1

QC

Alabama
note 175,
187

at

State Federation of

Labor

v.

McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). See

also Westling, supra

396.

Notably the prohibitions against advisory opinion emanating from Art.

Ill

are substantially related to

the rationales behind other doctrines of justiciability.
188

see Bickel, supra note 177, at

1

15-1 16

OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 475,478
Harv. L. Rev. 1002(1924).

(

quoting Frankfurter, Advisory opinions,

(1930)

);

see also Frankfurter,

in

ENCYCLOPEDIA

A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37

42

bb)

The

U.S. Doctrine Relating

who

This doctrine seeks to decide the question,

As

enforcement of a claimed legal duty".

has the "right to seelc judicial

Justice Scalia pointed out in

Lujan

vs.

in order for a claimant to gain access to the federal courts,

Defenders of Wildlife

must

To Standing

satisfy hree elements

he

of standing:

must have suffered an "injury in fact"-- an
invasion of a legally- protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized ...; and b) "actual or imminent", not
First, the plaintiff

192

"conjectural" or "hypothetical"

.Second there must a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of
-

the injury has to be "fairly

action

of

independent

action

Third,

court".

...

it

trace [able] to the challenged

and not

defendant,

the

...

the

of the

result

of some third party not before the

must be

"likely", as

opposed

to

merely

"speculative" that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision".

It is

apparent that there are three very important requirements; injury in

fact,

causation and redressability, and that these requirements purport to rest on the need to
assure a sufficiently concrete record and sufficient adverseness, to aid the court in

deciding constitutional issues.

However

is

it

not easy to achieve a uniform definition of

these concepts. For example, the concept of "injury in facf as David

Logan observed,

"can be described, but not defined with precision since what constitutes injury in fact

I

is

eg

William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing
'^°1

,

98 Yale

L.

J.

221 227 (1988).

12 S.Ct. 2130(1992).

'^'ihe court referred to Warth v Seldin 422 U.S. 490,508 and Sierra Club v Morton 405 U.S. 727, 740741.
192

The court

referred to

Whitmore v Arkansas 495 U.S.

149, 155 (1990)

(

quoting Los Angeles

461 U.S. 95, 102(1983).
193

^^^

The

court cited

Supra.

x\oit

Simon v Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S.

159,

at

2 136.

26, 41-42.

vs.

Lyons,

43

an

concept that the court

elastic

may

the courts at least require that the injury

court

is

always reluctant

to vindicate

^

construe broadly".'

must be

what

it

distinct

But, despite these anomalies,

and individuated.

Hence, the

considers to be generalized claims regarding
197

constitutionality, legality or the public interest.

On

the other

hand the causation requirement

that the injury is traceable to the challenged action

law indicates

that the courts

must show

entails that the plaintiff

of the defendant

have used different formulations

.

However

in order to

,

case

determine

causation, ranging from requiring a minimal showing of "a substantial likelihood of

causation"
failure to

to a

showing of "causation

come up with

is

so remote at best.

allowed third party standing where there
real party is

real party will

195

Nevertheless, despite the

a single formula, the court has granted standing where the causal

connection between the parties

and the

to a certainty".

is

201

The Supreme Court has

also

a substantial relationship between the parties,

unable to assert the claim, and that the constitutional right of the

be diluted

David A. Logan Standing
,

if

a third party were not allowed to invoke

to Sue:

it.

A proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, (1984)

The

latter test

Wise. L. Rev.

37,43.
196

supra, note 190, at 501.

'''id.
iqo

Simon v Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
199

See Duke Power Co.

V

See United States V.

426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).

Carolina Envitl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 note 20 (1978).

See Warth Case, supra, note 191,
201

Org.,

at 505.

SCRAP, 412 US 669

(1973)

(

students were granted standing to challenge

ICC

order regulating railroad rates because the agency action would increase the use of nonrecyclable

commodities, thereby increasing consumption of natural resources that might have to be extracted from
geographical areas

in

which

SCRAP members

lived, thereby increasing litter,

enjoyment of the environment). See also Logan, supra, note 164,

at

and thereby impairing

their

45 note 40.

202

See Eisenstadt

v.

Baird, 405 U.S.

438 (1972)

Threshhold Procedural Considerations In Right-

;

See also Sharon
to-

Die

F.

DiPaolo, Getting Through the door:

Litigation, 6 Risk: Health Safety

&

Env't 59, 66.

44
sets a very high standard

and

is

young democracy

definitely not productive in a

like

Malawi.
In a recent attempt to articulate further the basic requirements of standing, the
courts have insisted that a showing of an injury in fact to the particular plaintiff

who

seeks to bring the case ensures concreteness. Such an approach was indicated by Justice

Kennedy

in his concurring opinion in

While
injured

Lujan

does not matter

it

by the challenged

must show
personal
formality.

Defenders of Wildlife:

vs.

how many
him

that the action injures

way.
It

This

persons have been

action, the party bringing the suit

requirement

is

in a concrete

not

just

an

and

empty

preserves the vitality of the adversarial process

by assuring both that the parties before the court have an
actual, as opposed to a professed, stake in the outcome, and
that, "the legal

rarefied

the

questions presented... will be resolved, not in

atmosphere of a debating society, but in a

concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation

of the consequences of the judicial action".

Where an

organization

is

the plaintiff

following rules are satisfied, for example
their

own

(b) the interest

right;

it

if

(

,

it

203

can sue on behalf of

a) its

members

will

its

members

if the

have standing to sue in

seeks to protect are germane to the organization's

purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual

(

citing other old cases

203

Supra note 190,

at

United for Separation

where

members

this

in the lawsuit.

An

organization

may

its

exception to the standing rule was recognized).

2147. Note that the court quoted Valley Forge Christian College

of Church and State 454 U.S. 464

204

See Competitive Enterprise

also sue in

Institute

V NHTSA,

,

Americans

v.

472.

901 F.2d. 107,

1 1 1

(D.C. Cir. 1990)

(

citing

Hunt v

Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)) Note that American legal
Scholars have questioned whether this criteria truly promote the optimum conditions for constitutional
adjudication. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant In Public Actions: The Non- Hohfeldin or Ideological

Washington

Plaintiff,

(1961).

1

State

16 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1033 (1968). Cf Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40

45

own

right

where

can show some concrete injury

it

to,

for

example,

its

activities or

functions.

What, then
relying

on

,

are the reasons for such stringent rules ?

article III

"Cases or Controversies"

The

The argument

limitation.

rules preserve the system of separation of powers as

courts justify the rules
is

that these

enumerated in the Constitution since

they ensure that the federal courts only decide "concrete cases" brought before them

thereby restraining them from intruding in the ambits of the other two branches of

The other reason advanced

government.
that the parties

for these stringent rules is that they ensure

coming before the court have enough of an

interest in the

case so that issues are presented in a vigorous and adversarial manner.

outcome of the

208

In addition to these core constitutional requirements, the courts have also adopted

prudential limitations barring a plaintiff from litigating "generalized grievances"

from asserting

rights of other people.

The

and

rule against generalized grievance stipulates

See Havens Realty Corp. V. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)

(

stating that

mere

allegations of "abstract

social interests" will not suffice).
'y(\f.

See David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, Wise. L. Rev. 37,

38(1984)

(

suggesting that "[b]y examining whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise

justiciable controversy to obtain Judicial resolution of that controversy, federal courts use standing to limit
their jurisdiction in

accordance with the rather enigmatic language of Article

III

that only cases or

controversies are to be adjudicated").
207

See Douglas L. Parker, Standing to Litigate Abstract Social Interest

in the

United States and Italy:

Reexamining Injury In fact, 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l 259, 266(1995); see also Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 1 7 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 88
(1983).
208

See Baker v Carr, supra, note 142

See United
plaintiff
statute

is

418 U.S. 166 (1974). Note

that in

some

constitutional cases

where the

suing under a statute the courts require him to be within the zone of interest of the underlying

on which the claim

Postal workers
210

States v Richardson,

at 186.

is

based, see Parker, supra, note 207, (citing Air Conference of America v

Union 498 U.S. 517 (1991); and Clarke v

Securities Industry Assn.,

See Warth Case, supra, note 191 For an instance where a third party
.

behalf of another person, see Havens Realty Corp.

v.

is

479 U.S. 388 (1987)

permitted to bring a claim on

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).

46
that,

"when

measure by

harm

the asserted
all

is

a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal

or a large class of citizens, that

exercise of jurisdiction."

harm alone normally does not warrant

In addition, the Federal courts

exercise of jurisdiction will be unwise
212

waste scarce judicial resources.

,

a typical example

cc)

is

these

when

where accepting a case

the
will

These prudential rules have been justified on the

ground that they protect the autonomy of those
these rules are court created, they

may invoke

may

who

are not present.

However, since

be waived by a court or an act of Congress.

''*

The Ripeness And Mootness Doctrines

Ripeness and mootness are additional requirements that the Federal courts
consider

when determining whether

These were originally viewed
21 S

requirement of

article III.

to grant jurisdiction or not to a party bringing a suit.

strictly as part

Of

late the courts

doctrines, like the standing doctrine

^^Varth,
212

id,

at

approach

has indicated that these two

have both constitutional and prudential

itself,

499.

See Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-194 (1976)

would cause

of the constitutional case or controversy

inefficient use

(

declining to invoke third party limitation where

of Judicial resources). See also Brian A. Stem,

it

An Argument Against

Imposing the Federal ^Case or Controversy Requirement" on State Courts, 69 N. Y. U.

L.

Rev

77. 83-84

(1994).
213

See Brilmayer, supra
ones, also protect the

,

note 165

(

suggesting that "the core rules on standing, as well as the prudential

autonomy of nonparties"). Note

that the rules regulating standing has

by many scholars, questioning whether the goals allegedly served by the current

been attacked

rules are necessary for

the courts to carry out their functions, see Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 227(1990);
see also Cass R. Sustein, Standing

and Privatization of Public Law, 88 Colum.

L.

Rev 1432

(1988).

214

See Craig case, supra note2 1
215

See Liner v Jafco,

Inc.,

375

1

US

301, 306 n.3

(

1964) (The court stating that "our lack of jurisdiction to

review moot cases derives fi-om requirements of article
judicial

power depends upon

111

of the constitution under which the exercise of

the existence of a case or controversy").

47

We

underpinnings.

will look at

other and they determine

The ripeness

them together because they

when a party may

inquiry

determines

bring an action in the federal courts.

2

must a controversy be

intervention?

It

to

harm

"whether the

circumstances

seek anticipatory

at

relief, for

Poe

is

220

Ullman,

vs.

constitutionality of a

Although the

A

218

Hence, a plaintiff can not

illustration

of the ripeness doctrine

effort to obtain a court ruling

on

the

Connecticut statute that criminally prohibited contraceptive use.

immediacy of the

serious questions

good

which was an

statute clearly threatened

"[t]he lack of

judicial

example, by requesting a ruling on the legality of an action

he fears might be taken against him.

work

for

how

has been noted earlier that the federal courts will not render "advisory

opinions" on legal questions whatever the circumstances.

that

matured

has

This formula warrants the question:
appropriate

present

asserted

1

sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention".

ripe

are corollary to each

harm

to the plaintiffs the court

threat described

of non- justiciability"

221

by these allegations might alone

article 111) (Scalia,

C.J.,
J.,

doctrine derives from constitutional case or controversy); see also
Practice and Procedure s 3532.1, at

1

12,

115-19 (1984)

that

raise

and went ahead and found that since the

^'^Compare Honig v Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Renhquist,
mootness doctrine might not be derived from

commented

(

concurring) (suggesting that

dissenting)

(

arguing that mootness

13A Charles A. Wright

et al..

Federal

arguing that ripeness has both constitutional and

prudential origins).
217

218

219

Warth case

,

supra, note 171, at 499.

See text on pages 36-39.

See United Public Workers v Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)

(

where the

to act contrary to the rule against political activity as expressed in the

such

activities.

The court

rejected their claim on the basis that they

broad claims of constitutional

expand

rights.

The court went

plaintiffs suit

mere

desire

were seeking advisory opinions upon

power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional
would become the organ of political theories"). Cf Adler v Board of Education, 342 U.S.

485(1952).
^^^367 U.S. 497 (1961)
221

See

a

further to explain that "should the court seek to

their

issues, they

was

Hatch Act of 1940 which forbade

id, at

(

plurality opinion).

501 Note that the court cited the Mitchel case, supra, note 219.
.
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Statute

had not been enforced

in eighty years there

be enforced against these particular

was no imminent

mean

that

plaintiffs. In other

to believe that

words the Court opined

threat to the plaintiffs to warrant judicial intervention.

approach highly lacking. The mere
did not

was no reason

it

was

less

fact that the

of a violation since

statute

its

it

would

that there

We

find this

had never been enforced before

existence threatened prosecution and

hence influenced people's decisions.

While the ripeness inquiry asks whether the harm has come
mootness inquiry asks "whether the occasion for intervention
involve litigants

who

had standing

clearly

to sue at the outset

into existence, the

persists".

of the

The cases

litigation

and are

deprived of such due to events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten underway.

Hence, the doctrine requires that "an actual controversy must be extant
review,

not merely at the time the complaint

As some

is filed".

"mootness doctrine encompasses the circumstances

at all stages

of

scholars have stated

that destroy the justiciability

of a

suit previously suitable for determination".

Professor

Diamond attempted

to analyze the doctrinal

dimensions of mootness as

follows as early as 1946:
[A]

moot case

is

one which seeks to get a judgment on a

pretended controversy,

when

in reality there is none, or a

decision in advance about a right before
asserted and contested, or a

222

See warth's case, supra notel91
"while mootness involves being too

,

at

499 n 10

late,

necessary stake

^^''steffel v

225

in the

in the facts

outcome of the

et. al,

supra, note 134

,

judgment upon some matter

see also Diapolo, supra, note

202

(

suggesting that

or in the law which allegedly deprive the litigant of the

case.

Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459

C. Wright

has actually been

ripeness involves being too early"/

223

This can be due to changes

;

it

n.

10 (1974)

s.3533, at 21

1

;

(

citing

Roe v Wade).

see also Kates and Baker, Mootness in Judicial

Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1385, 1387 (1974)

(

stating that the term

"moot" should only be applied to "only those cases in which a justiciable controversy once existing
between the parties is no longer at issue due to some change in circumstances after the case arose").
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which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any
practical effect

upon a then

existing controversy.

This formulation requires that the controversy should be "real and substantial

[,]...

admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character as distinguished

from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
facts."

Therefore,

the

central question in determining

of a once living dispute continues
will

to

have a sufficient impact on the

mootness

is

moot when

it

be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision
228

parties."

finds either that the issues presented are

mootness by

the

first test,

"live issue"

court stated in Lyons Case,

sustained or

and "personal stake" requirements.

a party must be able to

is

no longer "live"

The courts have generally

or that the "parties lack a legally cognizable outcome."

dubbed these the

of

"whether decision

Consequently, the court has attempted to generalize the causes of
declaring a case

state

show something more than

In order to satisfy

abstract injury.

show

the claimant should be able to

230

As

to the court that

the

"he

immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the

challenged official

conducf and

the injury or threat of injury

immediate" not "conjectural or hypothetical".

Diamond, FederalJurisdiction

to

must be both

"real

and

232

Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. Pa.

L. Rev.

125,127 (1946).

^^^See Aetina Life Insurance Co., v Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
228

See Wright, supra, note 192.
229

United States Parole

Comm'n

v.

Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)

(

quoting Powell

395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969); see also Corey C. Watson, Mootness and the Constitution,

v.

NW.

McCormack,
Univ. L. Rev.

143, 148(1991).

230

See Franks

v.

Bowman

^^'City of Los angeles
232

Id

v.

Trans. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 753 n.5 (1976); see also Watson,

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).

id.
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On

the other hand, the "personal stake" criterion requires a "logical nexus

the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated"

would

he

principles?

of adverseness and the

plaintiff should

benefit from the relief sought. But

As Wright pointed

foundations."

out, "the

as seen

Firstly,

and

in addition to this

it

In other words, there ought to be a

requires a sufficient degree of contentiousness.
sufficient degree

233

between

what

be able to show to the court that
is

the source for the mootness

mootness principle

rests

on three doctrinal

from the discussion describing the doctrine,

it

is

apparent that the doctrine has some roots from the case or controversy requirement of
Article

III

A good
state

which has caused the courts

to

impose minimum standards of continuing

life.

-yif.

illustration

is

the case of

Golden

law by distributing anonymous

vs.

Zwickler

literature

where Zwickler had violated a

concerned with a

member of Congress

during a pending election campaign, and sought a declaratory judgment that the statute

was

unconstitutional.

campaign had

left

By

the time of the

Congress for a seat on a

was no longer an

that there

judgment the person he had targeted
state court.

The court came

for the

to a conclusion

actual controversy.

Secondly, the mootness decisions are concerned mostly with the determination

whether any effective purpose can
the court

still

be served by a specific remedy.

to exercise discretion in assessing

whether the prospective benefit of an

injunction, declaratory judgment, or other specific
218

decision.

233
Flast V.

^^"^Roe V.

^''Vright

^^^94

A

Wade, supra, note

et. al..

Supra,

U.S. 103 (1969).

237

Wright

See

id.

et.al.,

remedy

is

sufficient illustration of the remedial doctrine is

Cohen, supra, note 172

supra.

s.

at 102.

149, at 124 (1973).

3533.1

This enables

too slight to justify a

United States

vs.

W.

T.

51

where the court

Grant Company,
defendant

who

stated that in order to establish mootness, the

has discontinued challenged activities must carry the heavy burden of

demonstrating that there

is

no reasonable expectation of repeating the wrong. However,

the court added that the party seeking relief remains obliged to satisfy the court that
pertinent that he be granted relief due to

"some cognizable danger of recurrent

something more than the mere possibility which serves

The

final

administration^'*'

and the need

to

keep the case alive."

it is

violation,
'^^

concern for the mootness doctrine involves discretionary judicial

which "focuses on the importance of deciding or avoiding decision,

The argument

to conserve judicial resources."

judicial resources if

is

that the court squanders

resolves an issue that no longer affects anyone

it

and also when

dismisses a case involving issues which are most likely to recur and in which

involved in unnecessary judicial lawmaking and prevents the courts from

when nothing immediate seems

Bandes has intimated, "these goals
of enabling the court

to give

are instrumental

meaning

to be at stake.

and subsidiary

to constitutional values."

making

In addition, as

to the

normative end

It is

worthwhile to

^^V5U.S.629(1953).
240

Id at 633. Note that the court
relief

even

in

may sometimes

use

its

discretionary powers to withhold declaratory

cases of actual controversy. See A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. V. United States 368

U.S.324(1961).
241

These emanates from the courts prudential rules as opposed
242

Wright

et.

Al., supra.

See also David

P. Currie,

to the constitutional origins.

The Supreme Court and FederalJurisdiction: 1975

Term, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183, 187-90 (1976).

^"^^David P. Currie,
244

Honig

V.

Wright

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 332 (1988)

245
et. al.,

supra note 210.

246

Bandes, supra, note 213

at

has

This self imposed constraint ensures that the courts are not

invested time and effort.

unwise decisions

it

it

309.

(

26 (2d

Rehnquist,

ed. 1981).

J.,

concurring).
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note that doctrines of judicial administration run parallel to the remedial doctrines and

mostly they attempt

to spare courts

and parties the burden of litigating and deciding mere

debating points.

These exceptions

There are four major exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
enable the courts to hear the case despite the fact that there

The

controversy.

no longer a

is

live

one involves wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review.

first

This covers injuries which occur and disappear so quickly that they will always be moot

was

when

pregnant

she filed her complaint challenging a state law prohibiting abortion.

By

is

over.

the time the case reached the

Roe

Wade

plaintiff

before the court litigation

vs.

is

the case in point.

The

was completed she no

Supreme Court, her pregnancy

longer sought an abortion. The court nonetheless decided the constitutional question

presented and reasoned that laws prohibiting abortion would

and

future

that they

would escape review because the time period

than that for litigation.

may

illustrates this

U.S.

V. R.J.

where a secondary injury remains,

is

For a critique analysis of the exceptions

250

Chemerinsky,

251
Id.

see, Note,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Wade, supra, note

in s

(

New

3533 note

3.

149.

wrong capable of review and

Court).

^"392

vs.

114-18 (1989).

arguing that by such reasoning, the complaint

230, presents a

example, collateral

A Unified Approach To Justice.

At 125; See also Erwin Chemirinsky, A Unified Approach

680 (1990)

for

permitted where "under either state or federal law further

248

E.

for gestation is shorter

of the primary injury. Sibrone

Reynords Tobacco Co., D.C.N.J. 1976, quoted

249

in the

exception clearly. The Supreme Court stated that adjudication of

the merits of a criminal case

247

is

exist after the disappearance

252

York

wrongs

251

The second exception
consequences

inflict

U.S. 40, (1968).

it

to Justiciability,!!

in City

of Los Angeles

Conn. L. Rev. 677,
v.

Lyons, supra, note

should have been heard and decided by the Supreme

53

can be imposed ... as a result of the judgment which has

penalties or disabilities

been

.

.

.

satisfied."

The

third exception is

known

as voluntary cessation. For

stops the offending practice but can resume

case as moot.

As

was pointed out

it

in

it

at

example

United States

W.

vs.

T Grant

liberal

approach to the class action

example

in

flexible character of the Article

allowed despite the

suits

III

vs.

Geraghty

mootness doctrine".

the court has developed a practice

fact that the

named

plaintiff

"voluntary

Co.,

power

to hear

and

finally, the court offers

in relation to the

Comm 'n

United States Parole

"flexible character",

And

does not render the case moot."

i.e.,

defendant

any time, the court does not dismiss the

cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of

determine the case,

if the

a

mootness doctrine. For

the court spoke of

"the

Pursuant to this so called

where by class action

no longer presents a

suits are

live controversy.

dd) The "Political Question" Doctrine

The doctrine emanates from

the idea that there are certain subjects

inappropriate for judicial review and that such subjects should be

branches

of the

government,

even

requirements discussed above are

253.

though
258

satisfied.

the

which

are

left to

the political

and

justiciability

jurisdictional

The general consensus

is

"[tjhat the

,

la.

254

Grant Co. Case supra, note 239

at

632.

^^^445 U.S. 388, (1980).
^^

V

257

at

Note

400.

that such a preferential

which has argued
III

approach has come under intense attack from the scholarly community

that such treatment should equally be afforded to class action suits that fulfill the article

requirements for standing too. For example, see Chemerinsinky, supra, note 218,

258

See Chemerinsky, supra note 251,
,

at 142.

at

682.
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political question doctrine

Madsonr
of

stems from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in

In this celebrated

law authoritatively

case even as he claimed the

for all three branches

power

Mar bury

vs.

to decide questions

of government. Chief Justice Marshall

recognized limitations on that power:

The province of

the court

is,

solely, to decide

of individuals, not to inquire
Questions in their

how

the

executive,

rights

or the

which they have a discretion.
nature political, or which are, by the

perform duties

officers,

on the

in

constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never

made

be

in this court.

Marshall's statement gave birth to constitutional law debate. The courts and

academic commentators have struggled with the following two questions: what issues of

law requires judicial decision and what issues are

The

government.

court attempted to

better left to the political branches of

come up with a

where qualified voters of certain counties

Carr,

civil rights statute alleging that a certain

Tennessee

in

definitive statement in

The court found

in favor

statute deprived

is

it

them of

the equal

debased the value

of the complainants and stated that the issue

did not present a "non justiciable" political question.
"nonjusticiability of a political question

The court

further noted that the

primarily a ftmction of

the separation of

powers."

2^9

See

J.

Peter

Mulhem,

In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97, 102

(1988).
^^^

5«/?ra, note 94, at 170.

Michelle D. Gouin, United States

V.

Alvarenz-Machain: Waltzing with the Political Question

Doctrine. 26 Conn. L. Rev. 759, 766 (1994).

supra, note 141.

^"/c/. at 187-88.

vs.

Tennessee sued under a federal

protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment, as

of their votes.

Baker

55

This statement indicates that there are other secondary reasons for adhering to the
doctrine,

the

and these can be found

Brennan's further definition of the doctrine in

in Justice

same opinion:
It

is

apparent that several formulations ...may describe a

political question, although

identify

as

it

essentially

powers. Prominent on
a

political

a function of the separation of

the surface of any case held to involve

question

constitutional

each has one or elements which

is

found

a

commitment of

textually

demonstrable

issue

a

the

to

coordinate

political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable or

manageable standards

for resolving

or the impossibility of

it;

policy determination of

kind

clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility

of the

deciding without an

initial

undertaking

courts

independent

expressing lack of the respect due

resolution

without

coordinate branches of

government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence

made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various

to a political decision already

departments on one question.

The long quotation above
of the

political question, is

such issues.

indicates that the additional factor that

the courts' lack of clear standards for the adjudication of

In addition to the

two

same opinion quoted from Coleman
determining whether

prompts a finding

criteria

mentioned above. Justice Brennan

vs Miller

in the

in defining the political question: "In

a question falls within [the political question] category, the

appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of
the political

^^V,

at

departments and also the lack of satisfactory

criteria

for

a judicial

2 17.

Cf Champlin and Schwarz,
13 Hofstra L. Rev. 215,

finding a political question).

^^^307 U.S. 433 (1937).

Political Question Doctrine

219 (1988)

(

And Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power,

suggesting that the absence of standards should not be a basis for

56

determination are dominant considerations".

This adds the "fmahty" requirement as a

basis for a finding of a poHtical question. Rather than present the arguments that have

been developed elsewhere as

and

to the logic

avoidance of constitutional adjudication of

practicality

of the courts' reasoning for the

political questions,

to note that the effect of the political question doctrine

is

it

is

sufficient here

to render certain constitutional

provisions off bounds for the federal courts.

For Malawi,

we

suggest that in exercising discretion in matters involving "political

questions" the courts should be able to weigh the overall effect

its

decision

may have on

both the structure of government and on the society, since the courts are mandated to
decide

all

constitutional issues

Malawi because

feasible for

constitutional issue

as

where there

to deal with constitutional issues

by the

text

opposed
is

of the constitution. This approach seems

US

to the

where judges are

no pressing need,

by the constitution

270

the

free to avoid

Malawi judges

any

are obligated

itself

767

Baker, supra, note 141

210

at

(

quoting Coleman, id

See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone:

,

at

454- 55).

Do We Still Need The Political

100 Dick. L. Rev. 303; see also Gouin, ^upra note 229

;

Peter

Question Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97, 109 (1988)( reporting
free to avoid

any constitutional issue when they find no pressing

judicial review

269

is

not grounded

in the text

Question Doctrine,

Mulhem, /« De/ence o///7ePo////ca/
that "L. Hand suggested that judges are
need to intervene since the power of

J.

or structure of the Constitution").

See Chemerinsky, supra note 220, 694-695

(

questioning

if its

proper for the courts to refuse to hear

cases of alleged constitutional violations on the basis of this doctrine); for instances where the fedaeral
courts invoked the doctrine see. Smith v Reagan, 844 F. 2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S 954

(1988)

(

Iran-

2d 194 (3d

Contra scandal); Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v Reagan, 786

Cir. 1986), cert,

denied sub nom. American Baptist Churches v Reagan

(challenging the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican); Mitchell
61 1,616 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
270

Mulhem,

(

challenging legality of Vietnam

supra, note 244.

War due

to lack

,

v.

F.

479 U.S. 914 (1986)
Laird, 488 F.2d

of proper declaration).

CHAPTER III

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE U.S MODEL IN MALAWI
As noted
itself after the

elsewhere, Malawi adopted a

US

constitutional system.

law of the land and

states that "[a]ny act

with the provisions of
272

invalid."

new

constitution in 1994

Article 5

makes

27

which models

the Constitution the

of government or any law that

this Constitution shall to the extent

is

supreme

inconsistent

of such inconsistency, be

This makes every action of government subservient to the Constitution

Courts, however, are entrusted with

the

responsibility of interpreting, protecting

enforcing the Constitution and any laws under

it.

This responsibility manifests

271

and

itself

under the provisions of Article 108 which provides thus:
There

(1)

shall

be a High Court for the Republic which shall

have unlimited original jurisdiction
civil or criminal

to hear

and determine any

proceedings under any law. (2)

Court shall have original jurisdiction

The High

review any law, and

to

any action or decision of the government, for conformity with
this

Constitution,

save

as

provided

otherwise

by

this

Constitution.

271

See the introduction.

^^^MAL. CONST,

art 5

.

273

Article 4 of the Constitution further stipulates in clear terms that

and judicial organs of the

state at all levels

of the Government and

the equal protection of this Constitution and

^^Vrticle 108(1) and

all

laws

made under

(2).

57

it

all

it.

shall

bind

all

executive, legislative

the peoples of

Malawi

.

are entitled to

58

This

is

a very significant step in Malawian constitutional law since

position of the courts

.

And

it

was

it

enhances the

a direct reaction to President Banda's dictatorship of

30 years and a general dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system of government

which

individual and

failed to protect

Judge Mwaungulu

in the case

Congress Party, ^^^

after

endorsed
forestall

that

it is

and intimated

vs.

Attorney General and Malawi

examining the debates and discussions of the Constitution

tyranny whether

action",^^^

of wanton violations.

rights in the face

Fred Nseula

of

view by observing

this

human

it is

by the

main

"the

that

thrust of the

political will

that the "[t]he

powers of

1

994 Constitution

is

to

expressed in executive or legislative

[the]

court under the Constitution are

the custodian of the Constitution and the ultimate preserver of human rights for

the citizen".^"

The framers of

this Constitution

should be

commended

for ensuring that rights

should be protected by the courts. However, there are a number of hurdles that the
judiciary and the society as a whole need to

overcome

in order to achieve

of the institution of judicial review as a tool for the safeguard of these
hurdles emanate from a) the ambiguity in

background of the nation, and
Hence,

some of

rights.

These

the constitutional provisions b) the

c) the present political

this chapter looks at those

optimum use

and socio-economic

elements in the society that

make

the

situation.

US model

viable, together with the likely negative characteristics inherent in the society

needs to be done in order to remedy the problems. In our proposals

275

Civil

276, ,
Id, at
.

277
Id, at

Cause No. 63 of 1996

(

we

and what

will rely heavily

High Court Principle Registry).

.

page

6.

page

14.

Note

that the provisions

1994 constitution has brought

under Articles 4 and 5 prompted the judge to observe that

into focus only

one document and one

determine the course of history and the affairs of men

:

institution that will ultimately

the Constitution itself and the Courts.'

'the

59

on the provisions of the Constitution and our own speculations due
adequate case law comprehensively interpreting the

to the

absence of

new provisions

A) The Structure Of The Judiciary

The 1994 Constitution

creates a unified judiciary comprising of

Supreme Court of

Appeal, a High Court for the Republic, and subordinate courts as prescribed by Acts of
Parliament."^ The Supreme Court which

Chief Justice and not
jurisdiction

less than three other judges.

and has been given the

consists of such

the highest in the hierarchy consists of a

is

number of judges

should not be less than three

by Magistrates and are found

The most notable

may be

at all times.

in

power of

explicit

as

almost

all

it

The Subordinate courts

up of the court

politics,

The

their functions

is

the attempt to create an

and any harmful dependence upon

all

and duties independent of the influence and direction of

internal forces.

to ensure judicial

The 1994 Constitution seeks

providing security of tenure for judges. In western democracies,

independent judiciary

"Wicles
279

Note

ensures the

existence

it

independence

to achieve this

is

that Article 137

of a working democracy and

of the Constitution creates a National Compensation Tribunal with authority

decisions are reviewable by the High Court.

Article 103 of the Constitution.

civil hability

by

believed that an

of a

104, 108, 110.

hear claims relating to alleged criminal and

280

103 (1) of the

persons presiding over those courts

any other person or authority. "^*° This provision seeks

from both external and

are presided over

starting point is Article

Constitution which states that "[a]ll courts and
shall exercise

constitutional review. This court

the districts in the country.

from

either the legislature or the executive.

a court of general

is

prescribed by an Act of Parliament which

"^"^

feature about the set

independent judiciary by insulating

The High Court

of the former Government of Malawi.

Its

to

60

government which respects individual

liberties.^*'

Though

the present

US

Constitution has adopted most of the relevant features from the

system,

it

Malawian

constitutional

has retained some of the older institutions from the previous Constitution. For

example, the appointment process

is

basically the same, except with a

few a changes

to

reduce presidential monopoly injudicial appointments.
In contrast to the
the

US

practice,

whereby

Malawi National Assembly plays no

all

role in the

nominees require Senate approval,^^^
appointment of judges except in the

appointment of the Chief Justice. The Constitution provides that a presidential nominee
for the highest office in the judiciary requires confirmation

"by a majority of two thirds

of the members present and voting". ^^'^ All the judges are appointed by the President

"on the recommendation" of the Judicial Service Commission.'^*'^
a

body

is

It is

believed that such

generally supposed to be politically impartial and the judges nominated are

considered on the basis of their professional excellence alone. This process looked more
attractive to the people since

country

was

to

insulate

it

the

provides for a stringent rule and the major issue in the
judicial

selection

process

from

improper

political

considerations. ^^^ Presently, the president can only appoint candidates chosen by the

Commission and

this

ensures that the court

is

not packed with presidential preferences

thereby affording the judiciary some extent of independence from the executive.

-)g
1

See supra, note 109and accompanying

text.

'Note that the defenders of the United States system of presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation of judges have argued that this process helps ensure that the judges appointed will have

views broadly consistent with the general population and thus more responsive

^^Wicles

^^''

285

to social needs.

111(1).

Article 111 (2) of the Constitution.

Malawi has borrowed

this idea

Gambia and Ghana. Note
Senate approval.

that

from the following countries: Kenya, Zambia Lesotho Swaziland

Ghana discarded

this in

1979 and adopted the

US

practice

which requires

61
It is

apparent that the whole purpose for creating the Commission

is

to achieve an

independent judiciary. Therefore, though Malawi has taken a different route, the end
should be the same.

result, hopefully,

goal behind the creation of the

weakness

in the present

entirely

is

to influence the choice

that the

Commission

Commission

may

this

of nominees for the judicial

to

an alleged

body, which has allegedly a

formed by the president, hence the fear

who

shall

of the Civil Service

offices.

this system.

is that

The

he might attempt

The Constitution provides

as

may

be the chairman

(b) the

Commission, or such other

be designated in that behalf by the chairman

of the Civil Service Commission;"^^
as

due

that the

shall consist of:

chairman

member

some doubt

will be achieved. This is

appointment process to

the Chief Justice

(a)

express

undermining the very advantages of using

significant potential of

Commission

Some Malawians

(

c)

such justice of appeal

for the time being designated in that behalf

by the

president acting after consultation with the Chief Justice; and
(

d) such legal practitioner and such magistrate as

may

for the

time being be designated in that behalf by the President acting
with the Chief Justice.

after consultation

However,
that

it

it

is

might appear

only

when one

that the president has

Commission. In

Judicial Service

looks at the surface in

complete control over the membership of the

practice, this is not the case

reasons. Firstly, the Chairperson of

nominee of both

considering this provision

the

Commission

is

due

to

the following

the Chief Justice,

the President and the National Assembly. "^^^ Secondly,

all

the

who

Chief Justice

is

Members of the

an independent

Civil Service

Commission

Committee of the National assembly
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See supra, note 283.

officer, then

the

if

we

as to their competence.

strict

proceed on the basis that the

same arguments

are appointed

a

members

of the Civil Service Commission, including the chairman are subjected to a
parliamentary scrutiny before appointment. And,

is

will seat well with the

by the president on satisfying the Public Appointment
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rest

of the members of the Commission since he participates

in their

appointments.

Hence, any potential threat of encroacliment on judicial independence through
is

body

this

very minimal indeed."**

The other notable
present constitution

is

feature

which enhances the independence of the judiciary

the tenure

and removal provisions regarding judicial

may

Constitution provides that a judge

such other age as

may

be prescribed by Parliament."*^ The provisions

retirement age for the judges.
age, the process for doing so

is

Though Parliament may change
so

cumbersome and heavily

Article 196 (1) provides that Parliament
(a)the provision to be
to

it

vacate his office on attaining the

may amend such

amended and

by the

mandatory
retirement
electorate.

if:

amendment
people of Malawi and

the proposed

has been to a referendum of the

(b) the Electoral

The

age of 65 or

the current

a provision

the majority of those voting have voted for the

and

officers.

fix the

controlled

in the

Commission has so

amendment;

certified to

the

speaker.

There

satisfying the
fairly

further requirement for a simple majority in the national

is

above

provision."^"

Assembly

after

Hence, one can safely say that the tenure of judges

is

independent from the control or manipulation of the Legislature. Furthermore, the

president can no longer retain a judge in office on the pretext of serving the "public
interest",^^'

and

this

ensures that there

is

no court packing of judges sympathetic to the

government of the day. However, a judge may be retained
age only where

it

is

after attaining the retirement

"necessary to enable him deliver judgment or to do any other thing

TOO

Cf

the weaknesses in the previous Judicial Service

^*Vrticle 119(1)&{6).

^^Vrticlel96(2).
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See supra note 75 and accompanymg

text.

commission

as discussed in Chapter

1.

63
in relation to

proceedings that were

commenced

before him before he attained that

age."^^^

The choice of a

we

noted

Monaghan

earlier,

fixed mandatory retirement age for the judges

some drawbacks

there are

in

giving judges

suggested, judicial independence can be equally

is

life

commendable. As
tenure,^^^

and as

"achieved by mandating

fixed nonrenewable terms of service.""^"* Hence, by mandating that the judges retire on
attaining the age of 65, the judges are given a
will assist in building

On

up

their integrity

measure of security

in their

job and

this

mean

that

and independence.

the other hand the provision for the fixed tenure does not necessary

once appointed

to judicial office, a

for exceptional circumstances

which may warrant the removal of a

procedure to be followed. Article

A

judge can not be removed. The Constitution provides

1

office

only

for

and the

19 (2) states thus:

person holding the office of a judge
"^^

justice

incompetence

may be removed from

in the

performance of

the

duties of his office or for misbehavior, and shall not be so

removed except

And

in

accordance with subsections (3) and

(4).

subsection (3) provides that:

The president may by an instrument under

the Public Seal and

in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, may
remove from office any judge where a motion praying for his
removal on the ground of incompetence in the performance of

the duties of his office or misbehavior has been-

(a)

debated

Assembly (b) passed by a majority of the
votes of all the members of the Assembly; and (c)submitted
to the Assembly as a petition for the removal of the judge
in the National

Article 119(1).

Note

that this provision allows the president to retain such a

Judicial Service commission.

"Monaghan, supra, note 125 and accompanying
See supra, note 122.
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Emphasis added.

text.

judge

after holding consultations

v

64

concerned: Provided that the procedure for the removal of a

judge

shall

be in accordance with the principles of natural

justice.

It

is

apparent that the removal process differs from the

respects. For a

Malawian Judge

to lose office,

should be found liable for misbehavior.'^^

On

US

practice in material

he either must exhibit incompetence or
the other hand, Article

Constitution states that judges shall hold offices during good behavior."^^^

a judge can stay in federal office in the

US

US

of the

III

appears that

It

as long as he doesn't misbehave, inspite of

being incompetent.
Several questions

come

to

mind

in reading the

the requirement of competence to retain office a

Malawi termination provisions:

good thing

?

Does

broaden the

it

grounds for removal of judges and thereby making the judges susceptible to the
organs?
in the

Who

initiates the

political

removal process? Does a requirement of a mere majority votes

house suffice to protect the judiciary from the whims of the National assembly?

The 'incompetence' requirement simply suggests a

failing to

meet a standard of

US

proficiency. This contrasts sharply with the standards established in the

judge can only be relieved of his duties for misbehavior

^^^

process which requires a two thirds majority vote of the

The provision

is silent

the Judicial Service

where a

and through the impeachment

members

present.

seen the Malawian standard of 'competence' can be easily abused because

it

Is

on who determines the standards of competence

"^^^

it

As can be

is

very

lax.

for the judges. Is

commission or the Legislature? Since the Commission can only

discuss the matter with the President after

it

has passed through the House,

it

implies that

T^ote Malawi has adopted these grounds from the 1966 Republican Constitution. See Article 64.

See
298

infra,

note 298.

The US Constitution
Supra, note 128.

limits the application

of the section to treason, bribery, high crimes and misdeminours.
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Parliament initiates the process for removal.
to set the standards for

"competence" of the judges. This

and can easily compromise the

The provisions

follows that the Legislature

It

integrity

is

is

supposed

a very dangerous scenario

of the judiciary.

requiring debate in Parliament can only offer limited assurance,
required. Furthermore, the hurdle can be easily

since only a simple majority

is

by the present government

since the ruling party

is in

the majority

overcome

in the National

Assembly. In addition, the President only need consult with the Judicial Service

Commission before endorsing

the will of the majority of the Parliament. This implies

that the final decision is his

and he

Commission.

These

observations

is

bound

not
a

indicate

to

implement the views of the

major weakness

in

the

termination

provisions which creates a threat to the independence of the judiciary.

The proviso

to article

1

19 (3) which requires that "the procedure for the removal of

a judge shall be in accordance with the principles of natural justice"
the procedure itself

is

faulty

and susceptible

provision regarding the salaries of judges

and

it

our belief that

is

judiciary. For

it

is

is

meaningless since

to political manipulations.

However, the

a good bulwark against political pressures

will assist greatly in

example the constitution provides

enhancing the independence of the

that all judicial officers shall receive a

salary for their services to be determined by the National Assembly^^^ and that:

The

salary

and any allowance of any holder of judicial office

shall not without his or her consent

be reduced during his or

her period of office and shall be increased
retain

its

original

value

and

shall

be

at intervals

a

charge

so as to

on the

Consolidated fund.^°'

It is

apparent that the Constitution not only protects the salaries of office holders

from reduction by the

^°°Article 114(1).

'"' Article

1

14 (2).

legislature, but at the

same time

requires that the legislature should

66

increase such salaries to retain

tlieir

original value in the face of inflation. This

makes

it

impossible for the executive or the National Assembly to pressurize the

virtually

Obviously, the Malawian Judges are in a better position

judiciary through this avenue.

compared

US

to the

the Article

Federal judges in this respect since, as

provisions of

III

inflationary pressures. ^°'

The

the

US

US

scholars have observed,

Constitution leaves judges to be subject to

further requirement of charging the Judicial Salaries to the

Consolidated Fund ensures the availability of funds for the judiciary for the whole year
since the

Fund

is

part of a yearly budget.

B) The Power

Of Judicial Review

The new Malawi Constitution gives
jurisdictional purview.

It

the judiciary broad

,

indeed unlimited,

guarantees that "[t]he judiciary shall have jurisdiction over

issues of judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue

within

its

competence. "'°^ This

earlier, the courts jurisdiction

away

is

a very significant

was severely

clear

It is

that the

amendments which gave

to the Traditional Courts,

an arm of

language in the Article 103

provision

leaves the jurisdiction issue to the discretion of the Court instead of making
control by the Constitution as

Under the above quoted

is

provision, the court

See supra, note 124 and accompanying

CONST.

See supra,
305

text

See supra, text

(1994)

on page

in

art.

103

it

subject to

the position in the US.^"'

grant jurisdiction or not in a particular matter.

^'^^MAL.

is

development because, as we noted

limited by the 1969

a big portion of the High court jurisdiction

the Executive Branch.^^"*

all

is

authorized to determine whether to

There

is

no requirement of "case or

text.

(2).

19.

Chapter

II (

controversy" requirement of

discussing the "justiciability Doctrine" which

article III).

is

a product of the "case or

67

and most importantly,

controversy". In addition,

power of

judicial review expressly, as

opposed

tiiis

to the

gives the courts the

Constitution

US

constitutional

system where

the courts has had to establish and develop the said power.^'"' Article 108 (2) of the

Constitution provides as follows:

The High Court

have original jurisdiction

shall

law, and any action or decision of

the

to

review any

Government, for

conformity with this Constitution, save as otherwise provided

by

this Constitution

and

shall

have such other jurisdiction and

powers as may be conferred on

it

by

this Constitution or

any

other law/°'

Apparently, the High Court
exercise "such other jurisdiction"

An

is

granted more than just original jurisdiction.

and powers as

example of "such other jurisdiction"

provision, the President has

Court.

In

what capacity

power

is

may

be conferred by the Constitution.

Article 89 of the Constitution. ^°^

to refer disputes

What form

As

to questions

executive.

^""^

opinions? This

is

this

mean

compared

id.

the legislature or

an

recalls

state

by the chief

that the Constitution allows the Court to issue advisory

a debatable issue and will be explored in detail later in the thesis.

The grant of express power of review puts
as

when one

"answers given by the justices of the highest court of

of law submitted by the house of

Does

this

a Court or just a

will such a determination take;

advisory opinion or abstract review? These questions become pertinent
that "advisory opinions" are

Under

of a constitutional nature to the High

will the Court determine such disputes?

legal advisor to the executive branch?

may

It

to the

US

one. However, there

Arguably the adoption of power of judicial review

the major criticism of the

^"''mAL. C0NST.(1994)

^°^MAL. CONST. (1994)

US
art.

courts.

108

(2).

art 89.

Note, supra, note 176. Emphasis added.

the

is

in

Malawian judge

in a better position

a limitation to this broad

the absence of constitutional

powers of

mandate has been

68
judicial review.

is

It

stipulated that the

provided in the constitution. "^'°
involving the protection of
protection of such rights.^"
since

appears there

it

is

power

is

to

be invoked "save as otherwise

not difficult to circumvent this limitation in issues

It is

rights since the Constitution is heavily tilted

The broadness of
no requirement

the provisions

towards the

number of

raise a

of "case or controversy" nor does the

Constitution state that the parties invoking this jurisdiction should be
parties."^''

Should the court adhere

to the strict application

the face of such a flexible provision?

The argument

of

that the court

the procedural or the substantive rules observed in the

attractive

when we

power of executing

exercising authority

(1) the legal

power or

."

especially

authority to hear and decide cases:

.

it

is

is

right

of

not limited to

evident that the framers intended to prevent any

is

to determine the constitutionality

the fact that the Court

power or

This indicates that the term 'jurisdiction'

unnecessary curtailment of the Court's jurisdiction by giving
.

US becomes

the laws and administering justice. (2) the
."^'^

.

,

cases or controversies. Furthermore,

.

should dispense with

consider the fact that Websters Dictionary defines "jurisdiction" as

"the administration of the law

and powers

"interested

the justiciability rules in

some of

the

issues

it

"such other jurisdiction

of governmental

acts.^'"*

In addition

given this power expressly by the Constitution dispenses with

Supra, note 309.

See supra, Fred Nseula case, note 275,
rights

of a

citizen,

be

to a

it

(

Judge Mwaungulu stating that 'where there

member of the House

our Constitution be seised of the case

if

is

a violation of

or not, Courts will on the generality of the provisions in

only to vindicate the rights of the citizen protected under the

Constitution which the citizen alleges have been violated either by legislation or legislative action,
resolution or decision').

^'^See supra, note 3 10
to the

(

The Constitution allows

High Court).

^'^Websters Dictionary, 2nd ed.

^^^Supra, note 309.

the president to refer disputes of a constitutional nature
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issues of legitimacy especially since the 1994 Constitutional Conference

all

by people from
In

all

the sections of the

society/'^

view of the two provisions discussed above

US

instead of just adopting the

the

Malawi

was attended

it

appears that the Constitution,

system of constitutional review, has gone further to give

Malawi Courts very wide

discretion in constitutional

adjudication.

Such loose

language gives the Malawi Courts an opportunity to develop and establish jurisdictional

and procedural rules

that are suitable for the

needs of the people, due regard being had to

the political, cultural and historical situation of the country. That, this

of the framers

is

evidenced by the wording of Article

developed and employed by
status

1(1)

of the Constitution which

the courts to reflect the unique character

^'^

and

Constitution

supplements

enormously broad scope of
particular

,

Article

1

the

legal resources

courts

broad

and provisions

powers

by

that the courts

supplying

may

1(2) provides that:

In interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of

law

shall

(a)

promote the values which underlie an open

democratic society; (b) take

Chapter

III^'*

and Chapter

full

account of the provisions of

IV^'^; (c)

where applicable, have

regard to current norms of international law and comparable
foreign case law."°

The attendance included

lawyers,

women,

chiefs, the disabled, etc.

Emphasis added.

^'^MAL. CONST,
318

^'^

art.

11(1).

This deals with fundamental principles of government.

The

supreme

of this Constitution."^'^

The

315

the intention

interpretation of this Constitution shall be

principles of

states that "[ajppropriate

1

was

Bill

of Rights.

^-VaL. CONST.art.

11(2).

an

utilize. In

70

As can be

seen, these are supposed to serve as guidelines in the courts' quest to

promote democracy and human
these values. However,

rights

and indicate the Constitutions commitment

some people have expressed concern about

judiciary's role and have suggested that

it

to

the breath of the

provides the court with an invitation to

overreach. But this argument can be neutralized by pointing out that the judiciary's lack

of enforcement power and a need to be accepted in the constitutional setting
(legitimacy) are powerful tools to check any abuse of such powers by the courts.

C) Safeguarding Fundamental Rights
In the recent past

Malawians have experienced some of the worst violations of

human

rights in Africa. This

regime

to protect

such

was mainly due

rights.

And

this

provisions recognizing individual and

merely recognized the personal
Charter^^'

And Freedoms

of commitment by the previous

was compounded by

human

liberties

to the lack

rights.

the

As observed

absence of specific

earlier, the

government

enshrined in the United Nations Declarations

and hence, there was no formal constitutional guarantee for the government

to

respect and protect these rights. In addition, the provisions under Article 2 (2) watered

down any

recognition on the part of

government of the personal

allowed government to do anything as long as

it

was done pursuant

to

liberties since

it

an enactment of

Parliament regardless of whether rights were infringed or not in doing so.^"

There

is

no doubt

1994 Constitution addresses these

that the

issues.

Chapter IV

adopts a detailed Bill of Rights incorporating individual, social and economic, and
political rights.^"

By way

of

illustration,

Malawi now has

a multiparty system of

government, and the Constitution guarantees various freedoms: speech, association.

See supra, note 86.
322

See supra, note 88 and accompanying

^^^MAL. CONST,

art

15-46

text.
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assembly, the press and various other

human

rights.

These serve as a yardstick for the

courts in measuring governmental action for conformity with the Constitution. Article 15

guarantees the protection of these rights as follows:

The human
shall

rights

and freedoms enshrined

in this

Chapter

be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature and

judiciary and

all

organs of the government and

where applicable

and,

to them, by

its

natural

all

agencies

and

legal

persons in Malawi and shall be enforceable in a maimer
prescribed in this Chapter.^'"*

This indicates a commitment on the part of the government to uphold rights and
freedoms, and also assures aggrieved parties some kind of remedy in case of violations.

Pursuant to the foregoing, the Government

any

action

is

which abolishes or abridges

Furthermore, the Constitution stipulates

Any

person

who
by

guaranteed

prohibited from
the

making any law or taking

fundamental

rights

or

freedoms.''^^

that:

claims that a fundamental right or freedom
this

Constitution

has

been

infringed

or

threatened shall be entitled(a) to

make

application to a competent court to enforce or

protect such a right or freedom; and
(b) to

make

application to the

Ombudsman^^^ or the Human

Rights Commission^'^ in order to secure such assistance or
advice as he or she

In contrast to the

US

may

reasonably require.

^^^

system, where the protection of

Human

Rights

is

entrusted

with the Courts exclusively, the Malawi Constitution creates other independent bodies to

^^"mAL.CONST.
^^^MAL. CONST,

art. 15.

art.

46(1).

Established under Article 20 of the Constitution.
327

Established under Article 129 of the Constitution.

^^^MAL. CONST,

art

46

(2).
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assist the courts

with this task. The only problem

that the provisions facilitating this

is

multiple approach seem to be ambiguous. Apparently, an aggrieved party has several

avenues to pursue

in case

of a violation. This, reflects the peoples distrust

substantive and procedural court rules

and the previous regimes dictatorship
having
courts.

in the society in general.

rigid rules governing the court

On

the need to blunt the influence of culture

and

,

is

that

it

The disadvantage of

severely restricts accessibility to the

the other hand, the culture cultivated over the past 35 years

customary norms has gone a long way

However, the ambiguity inherent
Constitution, will give rise to a

The above

make Malawians

provisions regulating

in the

It is

to

make

application

human

make

Ombudsman

the

to

judicial in nature. Article

The

or

application to a

Human

the

to

court.

it

it

is

Ombudsman which

Ombudsman may

investigate any and all

alleged that a person has suffered injustice

does not appear that there

available by

This ambiguity

123 of the Constitution provides as follows:

office of the

cases where

is

way of proceedings

any remedy

in a

appeal from a court or where there

is

reasonably

court or by

way of

no other practicable

remedy.
(2)

Notwithstanding subsection

of the

Ombudsman

under

this

( 1 ),

the

powers of the office

section shall not oust the

jurisdiction of the courts and the decisions and exercise of

powers by the Ombudsman shall be reviewable by the High
Court on the application of any person with sufficient interest
in a case the

329

MAL. CONST,

art.

rights in the

Rights

not clear whether the applications to the latter two bodies should be

enhanced by the functions and powers entrusted with the

and

combined with

number of problems.

done simultaneously with the application

(1)

,

generally a passive people.

provision authorizes an aggrieved party to

competent court and

Commission.

to

of rigid

123.

Ombudsman

has determined.''"''

is

further

are quasi-

73

Ombudsman

Notably, there are three instances where the

Ombudsman may

application from an aggrieved party. Firstly, the
that

no remedy

where a

situations

by way of proceedings

will be available

political question.

by the Limitation Act

suit is barred

The

can entertain an

act

in a court.

or

where

it

appears

may

This

cover

where the issue involves a

of the court since the claimant

effect is to oust the jurisdiction

has the privilege of choosing between the two forums, bearing in mind that the

Ombudsman
procedures.

is

A

the

more

attractive choice

better approach

is

due

to the

absence of any rules regulating

to put all cases involving violations

of human rights

outside the realm of the Limitation Act thereby enabling the courts to have jurisdiction.
the

In addition,
political

Ombudsman

should not be allowed to determine issues involving

questions since they go to the core

of any governmental system having

separation of powers.

The second limb
from the

court. Considering the fact that

instituted in the

of

deals with situations where there

this Court.

High Court,

And

And
It is

finally, the

no remedy by way of appeal

civil suits against

the provision greatly undermines the

in addition,

subject to review by the

most of the

is

it

is

High court

Ombudsman

powers and functions

meaningless since decisions of the

at the instance

government are

Ombudsman

are

of an interested party.

can take action where there

is

no practicable remedy.

very difficult to imagine what situations the framers had in mind here, suffice to say

the provision

is

not clear.

The inappropriateness of
becomes

clear

when one

looks

the functions of
at the

him

Ombudsman

or her that an injustice has been done, the

a court to adjudicate on an issue or on the

"°MAL.CONST.

art.

126

(

c).

Ombudsman

further

remedy provisions. Article 126 provides, among

other things, that "where the investigations of the
to satisfy

the office of the

reveal sufficient evidence

Ombudsman

shall

.

.

quantum of compensation. "^^"^ This

.

(c) direct

is

a direct

74

contravention of Article 103(1) which authorizes court officials to act independently of
direction "' of any other person or authority."'

the influence and

It

also contravenes

subsection (2) of the same provision which empowers the judiciary to determine whether

an issue

is

within

competence or not."^

its

The other body
the

Human

Rights Commission. This Commission

the Constitution and
It

consists of the

function

its

It is

years. Perhaps the present

remove

is

Ombudsman and

no terms of reference.

to

human

entrusted with the monitoring and protection of

to protect

the

Law

is

established under Article 129 of

is

and investigate violations of human

rights.

Commissioner."'' Regrettably, this body has

not surprising that

government

rights

it still

realizes that

has not been put in

it is

place after 3

redundant. The best thing

is

just

the provision creating this institution from the Constitution altogether.

While acknowledging the good intentions behind the adoption of a multiple system
for the protection of rights

and also appreciating the

workload of the High Court,

it

is

undermine the position of the court

fact that the scenario helps ease the

pertinent to mention that the overall effect

On

US model

in its entirety, they are

the other

hand

,

if the

Malawi courts opt

bound

to adopt the

to encounter a

problems. These hurdles most probably will be a result of

the

number of

rigidity

of the

Emphasis added.

"^MAL.CONST.
333

art.

103(1).

See supra, note 304 and accompanying

text.

Established under Article 132. The powers of the
(a) to

Law Commissioner

Includes:

review and make recommendations regarding any matter pertaining to the laws of

Malawi and
(b) to

their

conformity to the constitution and applicable international law;

review and make recommendations regarding any matter pertaining to

this

Constitution;

(C

)to receive

any submissions from any person or body regarding the laws of Malawi or

this Constitution;

(d) to report

its

for Justice

and

findings and recommendations to the Ministaer for the time being responsible

who

shall publish

to

in the constitutional setting, especially its role as the

defender of the Constitution.

of judicial review

is

any such report and

lay

it

before Parliament.
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justiciability doctrines, the different cultures that subsists in the society, the present

social-economic problems and the mentality of the judges due to their previous
orientation with the parliamentary system of government.

i)

Over

Method Of Constitutional

the years several

in different jurisdictions.

methods of constitutional

The following

modes

language, historical meaning of language in the

Interpretation
interpretation has

are the

commonly

text, intent

been developed

recognized;

plain

of the framers, structure of

the constitution, purpose of the provisions, precedent and the values and notions of
social policy.^^^

methods of

The Malawi Constitution gives

interpretation."^ Article

11

the Court

some

(1) stipulates that "appropriate principles

of

employed by the courts

to

interpretation of this Constitution shall be developed and
reflect the

guidelines in respect of

unique character and supreme status of the Constitution.""' Obviously, the

framers intended the courts to develop rules of constitutional interpretation that will be
suitable to the

Malawi

society instead of just adopting

principles that have been

developed elsewhere.
Further, the courts are required in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, to

promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society and take
of the provisions of Chapter

III

full

account

and IV dealing with fundamental principles and human

rights respectively.^^^ This provision to

some

extent mandates the courts to look

beyond

the constitutional provisions and take into account the social values in the society. This

mandate points the courts

"^

to the

non

interpretive

mode of judicial

MORDEN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER

"VaL. const.

Cap

"'mAL. CONST.

Art 11.

"^MAL. CONST.

Art.

II.

1 1

(2) a

& b.

(

review. This

mode

Garvey and Aleinkoff eds. ,1991) 26.

will
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be best for the country since
society.

The courts look
This

interpretation.

developed

at

it

adapts easily to the continuously changing values in the

both the linguistic and

well illustrated by the

is

in the US.^^^

fact that its flexibility is

The other advantage

the social context of a provision in

way

for this

equal protection thesis has

the

mode of judicial review

analogous to the customary judicial process. This

is

lies in the

so because

the Court can interpret the basic law in accordance with the social values in the society

which

in turn results in social

process.

It is

develop

the

in the light

non

harmony which

of these factors that

interpretative

is

we

the

main goal

in the

customary judicial

suggest that Malawi should adopt and

form of judicial review

in

way

such a

as to suit the

special needs of the country in constitutional adjudication.
In addition, the Courts should avoid distinguishing the substantive and procedural

provisions in interpreting the Constitution

purpose of creating a constitutional document which
This observation

is

especially important in

whole

since such an approach dilutes the

Malawi

is

the

supreme law of the

since the present

land.^''°

Supreme Court

is

under the misguided impression that the procedural provisions in the Constitution are
irrerevant

and

consequences.^'*'

judiciary

with

can

be

the

responsibility

Grey, supra, note 131.

See

infra, text

on

with

by

the

government

This attitude does not comport with

Constitution.^'*'

339

dispensed

p. 86-87.

^""See infra, note 380.

^''^MAL.CONST.art.9.

of interpreting,

without

Article 9

protecting

any

legal

which entrusts the

and

enforcing

the
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ii)

The

Justiciability Doctrines

For Malawi

aa) Advisory Opinions

We
theories,

noted earlier that these have been banned in the

namely

finality.^"^

a)the separation of

,

There

no doubt

is

powers principle

that the present

some

separation of powers principle to

US on

b) lack

the basis of three

of adversity and

Malawi Constitution

based on the

is

be wary of

extent, so that, the Court should

encroaching in the realms of the other branches of government. However,
should appreciate the fact that the present constitutional set up

Government and should come up with a way

human

rights are involved.

Government

to

abuse

its

The

following

government

in the case

that

can achieve

(e)

when

individual

is

easy for the

(ministers) are also

members of

it

of the Constitution.^"*" Attempts to construe

comes

this

to

of Attorney General vs Chipeta}^^ This means that each

power

is

assured of a majority in Parliament at

by simply expanding

Muluzi, has already availed himself of
Ministers which

is

by

its

in the country.

Cabinet.

this strategy

far too large for a small

on the meager resources

See supra, text

const.
Civil

in

chapter

Art.

96

The incumbent

all

times since

president,

by maintaining a Cabinet of 37

The President has done
to

this in disregard

Appeal No. 33 (1994).

is

of the

have the same portfolios reduced

II.

(1) (e). This

Mr

country like Malawi and a great constraint

1994 Constitutional Conference's recommendation

'"'mSCA

abuse by the

narrowly so as to deny them the status of Members of Parliament was rejected

by the Court

''''mAL.

why

to

the Court

powers.

Parliament according to Article 96 (1)

it

such abuse

are the reasons

the heads of government ministries

Firstly,

this clause

to counteract

is liable

c)

a legacy from the parliamentary system of government.

78
to

24.^''^

The

government

result

in theory,

though Malawi has adopted a multiparty system of

that

is

it is still

a one party

The second reason which

in fact aggravates the

two houses of the

Constitution^'^^ provides for

Attempts

government

to create the senate as

in practice.

above situation

legislature, only

that

is

one

though the

exists presently.

second chamber to check the Bills and policies has

repeatedly been blocked by the incumbent government on the basis that

it

will be very

expensive for the government to retain such a chamber.^"*^ The reason advanced by the

government

for refusing

to create this

second chamber borders on hypocrisy since

willing to keep a large Cabinet at the expense of the

it is

same meager resources though some

of the portfolios are redundant. Obviously, the reason for opting for the large cabinet
to ensure that there is

no opposition

in the real sense

blocking the creation of the Senate the government

The only hope

lies in

the role of the Court.

instead of banning opinions altogether,

is

It is

of the word and

that, therefore,

is

by

assured of complete autonomy.
in this respect that

we

Malawi should allow these from

suggest that

the Court but

they should take the form of declaratory opinions. Declaratory opinions are final and

hence dispenses with the issue of lack of

finality

which

is

one of the main reason for

rejecting advisory opinions in the US.^''^ Secondly, the ban in the

doctrine of separation of powers and the
contrast, a rigid separation of

up and there

is

Malawi Court

no defined

powers doctrine

limit

will not be subjected to a lot

^"^MAL. CONST. Cap VI.

AAI

Bulletin vol.35

See supra, text

is

in

No

Chapter

2,

II.

of

Article

III

emanates from the

of the Constitution. In

absent in the Malawi Constitutional set

on the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequently, the

^""Vl Bulletin vol. 35 No.2 (1995) 12.

See

text

US

1995 pl2.

of criticism

if

they issue declaratory
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opinions since the theories relied on in the

US

to

ban such

is

not grounded in Malawi's

Constitutional law.

The declaratory opinions become
the people in the rural areas are
therefore,

more prone

to ignore

still

unaware of

their constitutional rights,

governmental acts that infringes on their

the duties of the individual to the society

means

that if the courts are not

government
ineffective

away with

will get

and there

is

This

on the individual's

rights.^'"

allowed to intervene on behalf of such people
a lot of unconstitutional acts

no second chamber

Further, the present Constitution
is

rather than

rights.

and are

to counter

more or

is

a

much emphasis on

of the socialization process under customary law which puts

result

This

Malawi because most of

especially important in

This
the

,

since the opposition

is

check the government.

less allows the

Court to issue opinions.

evidenced under Article 89 (l)(h) of the 1994 Constitution which authorizes the

President

"to refer disputes of a constitutional nature to the

High Court.""' This

open provision and can mean anything ranging from seeking advice
constitutional disputes. This implies that the president

public authority and hence, a third party

may do

in these situations.

an

is

to resolution

of

this in his capacity as a

"'

Therefore, in order to

ensure that such opinions are final the Court should issue only declaratory ones. This

approach will ensure that no

official in the executive

can override the Courts decision.

bb) The Doctrine Relating

As observed under Chapter
claimant

satisfies

See supra text

in

following

the

chapter

^^'Artcle 89 (1) (h) of the

II,

To Standing

access to the Federal
three

elements:

Courts

injury

in

is

granted only where

fact,

causation

and

1

Malawi Constitution.

see supra «ote 176 for the definition of advisory opinions. This provision indicates that the framers did

not envisage that constitutional disputes should be resolved

in the

normal course of

litigation only.
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The

redressability.

rationale

is

that these

elements assure sufficient adversiness. This

evidenced by Justice Kennedy's statement

where he pointed out

in

Lujan

The Defenders of

vs.

that the "requirement is not just

is

Wildlife^^^

an empty formality" but that

"it

preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before
the court have an actual

presented

.

.

.

stake

will be resolved

outcome

in the
."^'''

III

text

.

.

and

.

that the legal questions

The Court's reasoning

.

.

imposed by the Article

constraints

the

.

.

.

of the

Malawi Constitution do not impose such

US

Constitution.

clearly points to the

As mentioned

earlier

constraints in Constitutional adjudication.

It

simply gives the High Court power "to review any law, and any action or decision of the

government, for conformity with
language

it is

our suggestion that any attempt to adopt a

rules obtaining in the

the

Malawi

US

deteriorate the situation since

economic

situation in

The
flexible

60%

social

strict

in constitutional litigation will

society. Restriction

view of

[the] Constitution." In

most people

are already restricted

due

to the social

been any improvement since then.
of food production

In addition to this

Malawi presently

in

According

economic

^'^

line in

May

for

Reports,

1995 and there hasn't

^^^

factor, there are

may

some

instances where an individual

lack the interest to pursue the matter due to,

^'V at 2 147.
^^^African Research Bulletin

call

These people survive on subsistence farming and

in the country.

infringement but

World Bank

to the

supra, note 190.

'''id.

and

Malawi.

and economic conditions prevailing

may be aware of an

adherence to the standing

be baseless and detrimental to

of the people in the country lived below the poverty

80%

and broad

of access to the Courts through inflexible rules will only

rules in Constitutional adjudication.

account for

this loose

16-June 15th 1995. See also Malawi

News

14-20 June 1997.
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many Malawians

perhaps, passivity, which

Dunduzu Chisiza defined Banda's
choose

Mr

to put

A

up with."^"

dictatorship as a "dictatorship

no opposition

is

chased Satan

Malawians

in heaven.

Why

away.

God

should

in the rural areas

Secretary of

which the

Health

in the

following words;

himself does not want opposition- that

Kamuzu have

citizens

was expressed eloquently by

manifestation of such attitude

Chipungu, the then Parliamentary

"there

acquired during Dr Banda's dictatorship.

is

why he

opposition?"^^* There are a lot of

who

of the southern region

profess such loyalty to the

present government.

Compounding
is

the above attitude

is

the

problem of

illiteracy

and ignorance which

very rampart in the rural areas. ^^^ This scenario has two consequences; a majority of

the people are unaware of their constitutional rights and

few can afford
interest.

to challenge

This situation

it

because the legal aid offices are found only in the two

To make
strict

the informed ones only

governmental action in court due to poverty or lack of

aggravated by the fact that

is

among

not easy to obtain legal aid

is

cities

of Blantyre and Lilongwe.

matters worse, these offices have acute shortage of lawyers. Obviously,

adherence to the

US

litigation will leave a lot

justiciability rules discussed in

Chapter two in constitutional

of aggrieved parties remediless.

The court should develop

rules

of standing

in constitutional adjudication that will

comport with the prevailing conditions and the nature of the Malawi
take the form of a lesser standard than the one observed
other people to litigate interests of other people where

^"Chisiza,

OUTLOOK FOR CONTEMPORARY AFRICA,

acknowledged the

fact that

dictator of the people.
358

359

I

he was

dictate

dictator.

He

in the

it

is

society.

US which

This

may

should allow

obvious that the policies

43-44. Note that even Banda himself

told visiting state department officials that

"I am a

by permission, by consent." See Malawi News, 22 Feb 1963.

Malawi News, 20 December 1964.
See AI Bulletin Vol. 34,

literate

and

that poverty

is

a

No

2

,

1994( reporting that less than half of the country's adult population

rampart particularly

in the rural

regions where most of the Malawians

live).

is
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adopted or a law passed by government infringes on the rights of the citizens but that

such citizens are unable to
illiteracy.

litigate

due

to social factors

like

ignorance or

This approach will also cover the vast number of governmental acts that are

unconstitutional but do not affect any identifiable persons in a
to

poverty,

form the subject matter of a

Our proposed approach
African scholar in the 1970s
[wjhile

may

it

who

consonant with the observation made by a renowned

stated that:

be undesirable to encourage the professional

meddlesome

interloper

is

some paradox

in the idea

to

invoke

the

do not concern him,

jurisdiction of the courts in matters that

there

sufficiently direct

legal claim.

is in

and the

litigant

manner

of a judge refusing, on the

lack of standing, to entertain a challenge to a law he himself

knows

to

be unconstitutional

because

makes criminal

it

exercise of a right granted by the constitution.

A

similar concern

City of Los Angeles

was expressed by

vs.

Lyons,^^^

the

^*'°

Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in

where the majority opinion declined

to

award

declaratory and injunctive relief to a claimant on the basis that the allegation that the Los

Angeles police routinely applied chokeholds

by use of deadly force
controversy.

He

fell

far

in situations

where they were not threatened

short of allegations necessary to establish case or

stated,

The Court today holds
to enjoin the

power

that a federal court is without

enforcement of the City's policy, no matter

flagrantly unconstitutional
that he will be

choked

it

may

be. Since

in the future,

no one- not

person who. like Lyons, has almost been

choked

even a
to death-

has standing to challenge the continuation of the policy.

360

Nwabueze, JUDICIALISM IN
See supra, note 206.

^"/c/ at 113.

COMMONWEALTH AFRICA

73

(

how

no one can show

1977).

^^'

83

The

dub such an approach

Justice proceeded to

"unprecedented and

to standing

unwarranted."^" Professor Fletcher has suggested that the American law should shift

its

focus from injury, causality, and redressability and "the merits of a standing claim must

always depend ... on the meaning of the
plaintiff relies.

right involved

"^^'*

upon which

the

This means that the Court must identify the underlying substantive

and determine

if the

constitutional provision

was intended

to protect

challenged conduct. Malawi should adopt this approach

right or prohibit the

will help

statute or constitutional clause

enhance the idea that the Court

rights of individuals

is

since

it

there as a tool to safeguard the constitutional

opposed

in the society as

such

to the role

it

played in the previous

government.

cc)

The

rules governing these doctrines determine

in the Federal Courts.

prudential

The Ripeness And Mootness Doctrines

These requirements derive

limitations established

formula for the ripeness doctrine
judicial intervention?

advisory

The

opinions

is

by the

how

rationale

US

when

a party

may

bring an action

from both constitutional text and

courts over a period of time.

The

basic

ripe should a controversy be in order to warrant
that the Federal Courts are not interested in

is

upon broad claims of

This

is

understandable in view of the requirement of the "case or controversy" under Article

III

issuing

of the

US

Constitution. Should

Malawi adopt

controversy limitation in the Constitution?

We

constitutional

this doctrine in the

are inclined to

negative for the reasons discussed below.

id.

Note

that this

was

a very close decision as

it

was

a 5 to

4 one.

supra, note 189.

The Mitcheir's Case, supra note 194 and accompanying

text.

rights.^^^

absence of the case or

answer

this question in the

84

Firstly

power of judicial review

the

,

for the

Malawi Courts

US

is

grounded

in the

Constitution itself and this power

is

unlimited. In contrast, the

power

is

heavily constrained by the limitations in the text of

in ordinary litigation

Article

III.

As was

constitutional issues

which

courts exercise such

indicated earlier, this provision dictates the

must

arise if they are to

be addressed by the

manner

court.^^^

in

which

Thus, the

US

courts are prohibited from considering any constitutional issues except as a necessary

incident to the resolution of a concrete case or controversy.

On

the other hand the

High

Court in Malawi has express power to review any law, and any action or decision of the

government

for

conformity

with

the

This

Constitution.

powers which should enable the Court

discretionary

jurisdiction or not

govemment.^^''

when

We

to

gives

decide

the

broad

court

whether

to

a claimant seeks anticipatory relief from unconstitutional acts of

are strongly persuaded that in situations like the

Lyons Case the

Court should be able to pronounce declaratory judgments prohibiting any future
acts

grant

of the government since no one can sue

if

a

strict

illegal

adherence to the ripeness rule

is

adopted.

Furthermore, since the legitimacy of the exercise of the power of review by the
courts in

Malawi does not derive from

litigation, a strict

the fact that

is

done

in the

normal course of

adherence to the ripeness rule will be pointless as constitutional issues

are given a higher status in the Constitution. This
is

it

is

evidenced by the fact the President

given powers to refer any disputes involving constitutional issues to the High Court

and

that the

High Court

itself is

empowered

conformity with the Constitution. Considering

becomes apparent

to

review any governmental acts for
the wording of these provisions

that the framers did not envisage the existence

of a case or controversy

Brilmayer, supra, note 165.

Note
its

that Article 103(2) gives the

competence.

High Court exclusive authority

to decide

it

whether an issue

is

within

85
in the rigid sense

claimant

we

who

analogous to the

US

position at

all

times or the prerequisite of a

should be hurt by the governmental actions

first. It is

suggest that instead of adopting the ripeness doctrine in

be able to exercise

its

On

view of

entirety, the

this that

Court should

discretion to determine whether to hear the matter or not

depending on the importance of the issue
to hear the matter at

its

in

and the consequences of refusing

in question

all.

which has some roots

the other hand, the mootness rule

controversy" requirement of Article

III

in the "case or

should be adopted by the Malawi Courts. This

is

mainly because the rule serves other purposes emanating from prudential reasons which

emphasize

that

important

inquiry under the rule

it

is

to hear a matter

pointless

specific remedy. This inquiry
will correct

The other

prudential

like

exist

The

any longer.

whether an effective purpose can be served by a

very crucial because

an existing wrong. Consequently,

purpose in granting a remedy

courts

is

is

which does not

if the

it

determines whether the remedy

wrong no longer

exist there

is

no

an injunction.

reasons

for the rule

is

that

it

prevents the waste of

the

valuable time and conserves judicial resources which might otherwise be

squandered in a bid to resolve an issue that no longer affect anyone. This consideration
is

pertinent for

inadequate.

It

Malawi

since both the

human and

will also prevent the courts

lawmaking and enable

it

to give

meaning

financial resources in the judiciary are

from indulging

unnecessary judicial

in

to constitutional values.

^^^

dd) The Political Question Doctrine
In the
review.^^^

US

there are certain issues

The reasoning being

See Bandes, supra, note 213.

See supra, Chapter

II.

which

are considered inappropriate for judicial

that such issues are sensitive

and appropriately assigned
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of government. Chief Justice Marshall stated the Courts position

to the political branches

clearly in

Marbury

vs.

Madison,^^^ where he stated that the province of the court

decide on the rights of individuals not to inquire

perform duties
of

in

which they have a

discretion."'

how

vs.

to

the officers in the executive

The doctrine

the separation of powers principle."^ In Baker

is

is

essentially a function

Carr, "^ Justice Brennan

explained the other secondary reasons for adhering to the doctrine which include the lack

of judicially manageable standards for resolving such

The Doctrine

is

very important and

issues."''

necessary for Malawi because

it

assures

respect for a coordinate branch of government and also recognizes that there are
issues that the court

Nevertheless,

is

not competent to handle due to unavailability of

a slightly

In exercising discretion in matters involving

able to weigh the overall

government and the

effect

other problem that the

the judiciary

itself.

"'/<:^ at

372

170.

Supra, note 142.

373

id.

"'Z^, at 21

"political questions" the court

decision

may have on

itself.

should be

both the structure of

Professor

The Mentality Of Judges

US model may
Mauro

judicial review takes in a given society

See supra, note 93.

by the constitution

society.

D.

The

its

information.

by the Malawi courts

different approach should be adopted

since the judges are obligated to deal with constitutional issues

some

is

encounter in Malawi

Cappellati's observation,

may come from

that the

form

that

dependent on a number of contingent variables.
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one of which
here.

is

the kind of judges that the society has produced.^^^

Though Malawi claims

independence, the truth

of a

is

to

have been a

that the functions

law judge throughout. The

civil

common

of the judges have been analogous to those

legislative

supreme, enjoyed the exclusive

legislature being

The

judicial function in contrast

the laws and implementation of the

mechanical application of

to the

highly relevant

law system since the attainment of

prerogative of developing and shaping public policy.

was confined

is

determined policies in the context of cases.

Hence,

it

will not be surprising to discover

intimidated by the overwhelming
entrusted with. This

is

power of

especially true

forming the backbone of

that

most of the judges are greatly
have been

judicial review that they

when one observes

the present judiciary

that almost all the

judges

have been trained under the old

parliamentary system of government."^ The major weakness that these judges are bound

emanating from

to exhibit

their training is a certain degree

of reluctance or timidity to

invalidate unconstitutional governmental acts.

A

case in point here

is

The Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and others

The

vs.

Attorney General}^^ The bone of contention in the case was the validity of the Press
Trust Reconstruction Act, a statute which reconstructed the Press
private trust, controlling about

number of

Mauro

The case

of the Malawi economy.

a charitable

involved a

issues but the following are pertinent for our discussion. Firstly,

opposition party,

on the

40%

trust,

the

challenged the constitutionality of the Press Trust Reconstruction Act

basis that

Cappelletti,

MCP,

had been passed

it

without satisfying

the notice and

quorum

The Mighty Problem of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative

Analysis, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 409, 411-12 (1980).

i^Iote

that all the justices presently sitting

on the Supreme Court were justices of the

previous regime and are very conservative and reluctant

Government

as

compared

to the

"^Civil Cause No. 2074 of 1995

more

(

liberal officials

High Court).

to

pronounce a ruling

High Court

in the

that will displease the

of the present High Court.

constitutional

requirements.

Secondly,

challenged on the ground that

it

expropriated private property arbitrarily,

violation of a fundamental right under Chapter

were successful

High Court.

in the

It

deprivation

was a

which

was
is

a

IV of the Constitution. Both challenges

was found

non compliance with

that the

Constitutional requirement rendered the statute null and void.

found that the Act

Act

Reconstruction

Trust

Press

the

the

In addition, the Court

deprived private citizens of their property and that such

arbitrarily

violation of the fundamental rights under the Constitution. Thus, the

court proceeded to declare the Act unconstitutional.

Though

it

was

apparent

the

that

violated

blatantly

statute

constitutional

requirements, the Supreme Court on appeal reversed the High Court decision

upheld

validity."*

its

procedure

is

that Article
in

The court

stated that breach

and

of a constitutional provision as to

not fatal and cannot render a statute void. Consequently, the Court found

96 (2)"^ which requires the Cabinet

to

make

legislative proposals available

time in order to permit sufficient canvassing of expert and public opinion (notice) not

relevant to the issue of constitutionality.

Even
place

was a breach of

if there

that, that
...,

The Court

stated that:

we

s.92 (2),

the section

is

view

are of the

breach would not invalidate the Act.

In the

first

under Chapter VIII, which deals with

duties and functions of the executive, and not functions and
duties of the legislature in Chapter

section

is

concerned with the

proposals, which, as
earlier

stage.

necessary, that

been included

is

in

Hence, the Court found

we have

for the
s.

379

seen, are formulated at a

under

(2).

S.

purpose of legislation,

that

compliance with

96
it

much
was

(2)

would have

We

Section 96 (2)

is

find the Court's attempt to

See Attorney General v The Malawi Congress Party and others,

MAL. CONST.art 96

of legislative

48 (1) of the Constitution.

precedent to the validity of enacting.

378

formulation

requirement

the

If

VI of the Constitution The

MSCA

Civil

not a condition

draw a

rigid line

Appeal No22 of 1996.

89

between the

role of the executive

and the legislature

purposes they are integrated by the Constitution
to distinguish procedural

lawmaking

in

and substantive provisions despite the respondents' persuasive

provides that "any act of government or any law that
this Constitution

Court responded

respect,

is

It

inconsistent with the provisions
."^*°
.

.

The

manner:

we

do

not

subscribe

to

general

this

by the

interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution

respondents.

a distinction.

of such inconsistency, be invalid

shall, to the extent

in the following

With

all

In addition, the Court attempted

itself

submission that Article 5 of the Constitution does not make such

of

since for

artificial

As we have

already

pointed

provisions in the Constitution and not

all

out,

not

provisions

under the Constitution invalidate an act of Government

all

made
if

they

are breached.^**'

Consequently, the Court concluded that the procedural requirements of the
Constitution can be dispensed with without even citing any authority. Such casual

robs the Constitution of

attitude to the Constitutional procedural requirements

as the

supreme law of the

land.

It

constitutional procedural requirements

In relation to the lack of

conclusion

that a reading

quorum should
reasoned

when conducting

quorum

it

of Article 50 (1) and

ignore the

business.

(2)^*^ infers

created a gap in that

it

quorum
was

at the

silent

that the requirement

of a

was wrong. The Court

beginning of the

on the quorum

sitting

of

for subsequent

arts.

note 276, at p.52.

These provisions requires the two-thirds of members inorder
less

to

status

dispute, the Court found that the lower Court's

that the provision only referred to

^^%AL. CONST,

government

persist throughout the deliberations of the bill

Parliament and that

^^^ Supra,

also encourages the

its

members than

to constitute a

qouram and

if

there are

reqiured by the Parliamentary Standing Orders the Speaker shall adjourn the chamber.

90

meetings. The Court quoted Attorney General

attempt to justify

its

Where

vs.

Johe^^^ a very old English case in an

finding where Lord Diplock had this to say:

.

.

.

omissions by the draftsman of the law to state in

express words what, from the subject matter of the law and
the legal nature of the processes or institutions with
deals, can be inferred to

which

it

have been Parliament's intention, a

with the judicial duty of giving effect to

court charged

Parliaments intention, as that intention has been stated in the

law

ought

that Parliament has passed,

to construe the

law as

which would give
to do so does not
contradict the words actually set out in the law itself and to
fail to do so would defeat Parliament's intention by depriving
the law of all legal effect.^*^
incorporating, by necessary implication,

effect to such inferred intention,

Pursuant to this Case
interpreting

sitting.

the Constitution

it

The Court

and reasoned

have a government

Assembly

the Court purported to effect the framers' intention

,

the Article 50 provision to

beginning of a

in

wherever

mean

that a

quorum

required only

way

such a

power which does not command a majority

in the

a legislative vacuum. With

for the court to give

all

due respect,

government which would not function
for the simple reason that

it

is

at the

further applied the doctrine of necessity in interpreting

that since our Constitution is designed in

was necessary

if

as to

National

an interpretation which would not create

we

find

the Court's fear

a strict interpretation

about having a

was adopted unfounded

so easy for the government to have a majority in the

Parliament through the expansion of ministerial portfolios.

The Court

is

by

^^^

also indicated that "the Courts are not concerned with purely procedural

matters which regulate what happens within the four walls of the National Assembly"

but that

^*^l

AC

it

will

"most certainly adjudicate on any issues which adversely

692, (1894).

^*V^, at 702.
385

Supra, text on page 75.

affect

any

rights

91

which

by the Constitution

are categorically protected

commendable on

the surface since

it

."^^^
.

.

This approach appears

enhances the respect accorded to a coordinate

branch of government. Nevertheless, the Court overlooked two important aspects
present case.

The procedure was required by

the Constitution itself and that

one of those procedures purely adopted by the National Assembly as an
Secondly, there

is

no second chamber

in the

was not

it

institution.

check the business taking place in the lower

to

house. This means that chances of Parliament violating procedural matters will be very

high since there
It

is

is

no watchdog and no one can challenge

our suggestion that instead of putting too

it

in Court.

much emphasis on

the

autonomy of

the legislature, the Court should have exhibited a keen interest in the present Case since
the procedures in question are provided by the Constitution.

Court's finding on the substantive issue,

we

While we do not

find the court's casual treatment of the

procedural matters disappointing. Impliedly, the Courts opinion suggests that
the provisions in the Constitution are irrelevant.

which the
been

statute

was passed was

illegal

fault the

It is

quiet obvious

that the

some of

mode

in

and the best course for the Court would have

to return the matter to Parliament so that the proper constitutional procedures

should be followed. The Court appears to be more interested in protecting government
interests instead

This

is

Constitution

of looking

at the issues in

question objectively.

not surprising since a trend has developed since the adoption of the

whereby

almost

all

the

cases

involving

the

new
of

constitutionality

governmental acts that were challenged successfully in the High Court and went on
appeal to the Supreme Court have been reversed by the Higher Court. ^^^ This
for

much

concern. Without meaning to dramatize the situation,

it

is

a cause

appears that the

386

'Supra, note 276.

^^'a few examples include Fred Nseula

vs.

Attorney General, supra, note 145, The Attorney General

vs.

Chipeta Civil Cause No. 1505 of 1994, and The Press Trust Reconstruction Act case, supra, note 314.
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Malawian Supreme Court has adopted
protection of

human

rights.

for itself a task

The impression

that

uphold governmental actions, no matter what,

of hindering the promotion and

one gets

is

that the

to the detriment

Court

is

prepared to

of the individuals.

CONCLUSION

In

1

new Malawi

994, the

was faced with

nation

institutions to determine the shape of

framers of the

new

as a guardian of individual

As

human

Justice Utter

by any individual nation,
necessarily be based

nation set for their
that the objective

upon

.

US

Not

rights.

is

article

surprisingly, the

its

significant

and

collorary function

US model was

the logical

an established democracy and has had centuries of

and Lundsgaard rightly stated "[t]he choices actually made
.

.[in

establishing the institution of judicial review] will

local conditions

new governments."

388

of the Malawi nation

and upon the objectives that the people of that

And

the

is to

achieve a democratic government through

the promotion and protection of individual

This

The most

the institution of judicial review and

is

choice for Malawians since the
experience.

the future society. In order to achieve this the

Constitution borrowed ideas from the West.

idea borrowed

very useful

the task of forming and adopting

human

Malawi Constitution makes

it

apparent

rights.

has attempted to highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of

both the present Constitution and the Malawi society in general in order to determine the
viability

of the

protection

388

model. Though the Constitution exhibits a deep commitment to the

of individual rights there are significant problems with the additional

mechanisms
institution

US

that

have been adopted

of judicial review

to

to ensure enforcement. In addition, since for the

work

Utter and Lundsgaard, Judicial review in the

successfully,

New Nations

Thoughts from a Comparative Persperctive, 54 Ohio

St. L. J.

93

it

always depend on the local

of Central and Eastern Europe: Some
559 (1993).

94

conditions, there
society

need

is

form

to

comport with the characteristics of the

itself.

The

starting point should be to get rid

above, since basically,

move

to adapt its

will

we

of the other independent bodies discussed

find their functions both redundant

enhance the courts' role

in the protection

step should be for the Courts to capitalize

and

irrerevant.

of individual human

rights.

Such a

The next

on the broad provisions of Article 103 of the

Constitution, dealing with jurisdiction of the courts and. Article 108, giving the

The

Court, arguably, unlimited express power of judicial review.
interpreting these

courts can do this by

two provisions generously and develop the non

judicial review as practiced in the

US. By adopting such a

High

interpretive

liberal

mode of

approach the courts

should be able to establish and develop flexible rules, both substantive and procedural, to

govern constitutional

litigation.

This will in turn

make

the courts

more

accessible to the

citizens.

The Court should always bear
Attorney General vs

mind

in

Momodou Jobe

389

the

statement

and quoted

in

made by Lord Diplock
Fred Nseula

in

vs Attorney

General:

A

Constitution and in particular that part which protects and

entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms to which

persons in the state are to be entitled,

and purposive construction.

This
case,

•J

is in line

namely

that

on

(1984)3 W.L.R. 174
See supra, note 275

Wat

5.

is

to be given a

391

with the approach advocated by Justice

the overriding

all

generous

Mwaungulu

factor influencing the court's

in Nseula'

decision as to

its

95

competence should be a determination of whether there
not.

Thus the Judge

is

a violation of

human

rights or

stated that:

[w]here there

member of

is

a violation of rights of

a citizen, be

it

to a

the house or not, courts will on the generality of

the provisions in our Constitution be seized of the case if only
to

vindicate the rights of the citizen protected under the

constitution

by

And

which the

citizen alleges

legislation or legislative action, or resolution or decision.

finally, there is

need

to orient the

the nature and purpose of the newly acquired
for civic education to the

constitutional rights and

an attempt
are

is

made

some prospects

courts in Malawi.

IdaX 14

have been violated either

to

whole society

judges

sitting

power of judicial review. There

in general to

what they should do

on the Supreme Court as

in case

make

is

to

also need

the people aware of their

of a violation by the government. If

implement the propositions discussed above, then we can say there

for adequate protection

of individual and human rights through the
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